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Preface
The Temporally Selfish Appeal of History

Where We Stand
This study is primarily conducted in service of the author and his time’s own self-interest.
Coming of age during the Trump presidency, the 2020 coronavirus pandemic, widespread
American political and social strife, climate change, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this
author is confronted almost daily with hundreds or thousands of examples of humanity’s disastrous
spiral towards our seemingly inevitable demise. Our most sacred institutions are under attack by
those we ourselves elected to power; those closest to us are struck down by an invisible enemy;
our society is drifting further and further apart from one another; our world is becoming
inhospitable for many; war, contrary to the proclamations of some scholars, stubbornly persists.1

Steven Pinker. The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence has Declined. (New York: Viking Books, 2011);
John Lewis Gaddis. “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System.”
International Security 10, no. 4 (1986): 99–142. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538951.
1
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The path forward is strewn about with hazards, roadblocks, and existential threats. The world of
today, once full of promise and optimism, appears to grow ever darker.
Yet, we have walked this path before. The history of humanity is one of rugged survival
against all odds. We have survived since time immemorial, our progeny carrying on our legacy far
further into the future than one could reasonably expect. Humanity has proven particularly resilient
to all manner of threats, from political and social instability to pandemics and natural disasters to
dangerous new technologies and their implications for society. Our internal, life-giving fire,
mythically bestowed to us by the Greek Titan Prometheus, has thus far proven inextinguishable.
For this we especially owe thanks to a great many members of humanity who seek to defy
the odds, usher in radical, sometimes necessary change, and foster advancements in society. In
ancient times they often took the role of king, Caesar, pope, or philosopher. In our time they are
called moguls, activists, or Presidents. Fundamentally, all serve the same purpose: to better
humankind through change; they are leaders. Change may take different forms—returning to
conservative visions of a past that never existed, or moving towards progressive futures that, while
they might yet come to fruition, are equally temporally distant—but remains one of most apparent
shared qualities among historical examples of strong leadership. Strong leaders, in other words,
possess a strong vision, in some capacity, for the societies to which they belong.

Leaders as Signifiers
We presently observe strong leadership day by day, viewing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
nearly first-hand through the miracles of twenty-first century social media. Specifically, many of
us have likely come to know the Ukrainian president, Vladimir Zelensky, quite intimately—insofar
as one can know any person halfway across the world whom they have never met. Zelensky’s
4
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world is tangibly darker than ours, and his task herculean. Journalist Sim Shuster writes that,
“Zelensky understands his core responsibility… not as a military strategist empowered to move
battalions around a map, but as a communicator, a living symbol of the state, whose ability to grab
and hold the world’s attention will help determine whether his nation lives or dies.”2 World
opinion, to Zelensky, is what will win his war, more than any variety of armaments. While the
population of Ukraine as a whole struggles in the face of Russian aggression, Zelensky has become
the face of an entire people. We link the life of a single man to the fate of an entire society. In that
sense, Zelensky represents all Ukrainians at this moment, certainly on the world stage. His vision
for Ukraine is one of survival and prosperity, of a nation’s security upheld and its people safe and
healthy. His tools, social and mass media, provide him the means by which he can most effectively
realize that vision.
Zelensky is but one modern example of such a leader rising to the fore during times of
pronounced crisis. During the Cold War of the mid- to late-twentieth century, similarly prominent
leaders of smaller nations sought to affirm or attain power. Their tools were numerous, using force,
strategic alignment with one of the major power blocs, or even Zelensky-esque, media narrativefocused tactics. Their leadership forged nations, guaranteed domestic sovereignty, and fought
against the historical forces of old—namely imperialism and colonialism.
This study was at its outset concerned with the role of three individuals in the construction
of national identity during revolutionary, Cold War-era decolonial struggles. It sought to examine
and compare Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, Fidel Castro in Cuba, and Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt
to better understand the sort of leadership and nation-building undertaken by charismatic-type

Shuster, Simon Shuster. “Inside Zelensky’s World.” Time, April 28, 2022.
https://time.com/6171277/volodymyr-zelensky-interview-ukraine-war/?utm_source=pocket-newtab
2
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leaders, drawing lessons from their successes and failures. Such a topic, as the study progressed,
proved too ambitious for the defined scale of the project. The author instead focused the study on
Gamal Abdel Nasser and Egypt, a choice that reflected the parallel between Nasser’s frequent
employment and manipulation of mass media and Zelensky’s contemporary strategy. The crisis of
choice proved to be Nasser’s finest moment, his 1956 resounding geopolitical, diplomatic, and
legal victory over the nationalization of the Suez Canal.
Nasser’s triumph at Suez presented more than a compelling case for the power of mass
media and world opinion, additionally embodying the dichotomous relationships between the
individual versus society and historical agency versus historical inertia. The study of Nasserism
(including pan-Arab nationalism), his regime, and his leadership throughout the Suez Crisis hopes
to offer the reader, and the author, insights on how and why radical change progresses through
history. While Nasser remains a morally ambiguous character—exceedingly authoritarian in
method (and antisemitic in mentality) yet populist, optimist, and even generous (to some) in
ideology and policy—there is much one can learn through observing him in a time of great
upheaval.
The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 does not directly parallel the issues our
modern society faces; examining legal debates over the Suez Convention of 1888 will not directly
enable us to offset our carbon emissions, reinvigorate our democratic processes, nor bring
Zelensky victory. However, a detailed study of the Suez Crisis and the man who instigated it grants
us tools and frameworks to use in our own trials and tribulations. For humankind has not changed
biologically since long before the advent of civilization; in other words, Nasser shares very nearly
everything in common with any and every one of us, genetically and neurologically speaking. Our
thought processes and analysis could therefore be identical. Someone who reads this study (or

6
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wrote it) could one day be in a similar position as Nasser, confronted with navigating a complex
legal, geopolitical, and/or ideological conflict with a nearly unmanageable number of variables.
Yet Nasser succeeded in asserting Egyptian will while avoiding large-scale conflict and
preserving international stability. The origins of his triumph run deep into the past, yet are uniquely
brought about by the culmination of various twentieth-century world historical processes and the
personal actions of a handful of influential individuals. The Suez Crisis’ study, both historical and
historiographical, offers compelling insights into the perception of one of history’s more
captivating examples of personal agency, and reflections on the degree to which one can influence
the course of human events.

7
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Introduction
The Evolution of Sentiments, Nasser, and Suez

November 5th, 1956
In November 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, found himself assaulted from
all sides. Earlier that year he nationalized the Suez Canal, a bold geopolitical gamble seeking to
ameliorate Egyptian regional prestige, strike a blow against European imperialism, and secure a
vital economic asset for the developing Egyptian nation. At the present moment, however,
Nasser’s ambition had been undone by his apparent hubris. As one might predict, the British and
French shareholders of the Canal Company did not sit idly by and allow the upstart Egyptian
populist to assert his will on two great European powers. After a lengthy period of negotiation,
legal debate in the United Nations, and a vicious propaganda war on both sides, the Anglo-French
alliance secretly convinced Israel to reignite still-smoldering tensions and invade Egypt.3 Under

3

David Carlton. Britain and the Suez Crisis. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 161

8

The Chosen One?

Hobbs

the false pretext of an international police action, seeking to separate the belligerents and secure
safe operation of the Canal, an Anglo-French force invaded Suez, reestablishing control of the
Canal via Port Said.4 Nasser was shaken by these developments and the increasingly likely
prospects of an Anglo-French invasion of Cairo and Alexandria.5 His regime, which had only
solidified power in 1954, now appeared as if it would collapse almost as quickly as it had risen.
Perhaps the predicament recalled to Nasser a particular quote of his, published in his 1954
manifesto Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution. Regarding the role of his modern
Egypt in the grand scheme of Egyptian history, Nasser wrote, “these thoughts are an effort to
explore within ourselves – to discover who we are and what our role is to be in the succeeding
stages of Egyptian history… These thoughts seek to discover the pattern of our national
environment and to make clear that we do not exist as an isolated island surrounded by troubled
waters.”6 Nasser, then, looked towards the past for inspiration and guidance in the present.
Examining ancient philosophy, ancient history, and early modern history, as did Nasser, one might
spot similarities between the Egyptian President’s struggle at Suez and other examples of historical
leadership. These resemblances across time and space not only place Nasser’s actions in a wider
historical context of leadership through conflict, but illustrate, to an extent, his historical
exceptionalism in comparison to other monumental leaders. The proceeding thoughts, then, are an
attempt to resolve Nasser’s queries: an effort to discover who Nasser was, and what his role was
in the succeeding stages of both Egyptian History and the interconnected histories of nationalism
and charismatic leadership. The Suez Crisis, an essential point of differentiation, will serve as the
focus of this inquiry.
Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis, 162.
Carlton. Britain & the Suez Crisis, 161-162.
6
Gamal Abdel Nasser. Egypt’s Liberation: Philosophy of the Revolution. (Washington DC, Public Affairs
Press, 1954), 11.
4
5
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We’ve Been Here Before
“The one is made up of all things, and all things issue from the one,” said the ancient Greek
philosopher, Heraclitus, of the dichotomous nature of life.7 The many and the one, one of these
dichotomies, were to Heraclitus one in the same. The many composed the one, and the one in turn
informed and dictated the many. In describing what he believed to be one of nature’s fundamental
laws, Heraclitus intuited a prescient and universal aspect not only of the natural world, but of the
manmade world as well. Throughout time, so-called “great” individuals have drastically altered
the axis of human progress, forever changing the course of history. These leaders, in turn, were
forged by their circumstances, including by those who chose them to lead, uniquely enabling them
to leave their mark on history. Some succeeded, implementing their ambitious visions for the
future of humanity and observing the great reverberations. Others, conversely, saw their visions
fade into nothingness, lost (in many cases, quite famously or infamously) to history. What
determined some leaders’ success and others’ failure? Two particular examples of grand strategic
failure by monumental leaders tend to reverberate across time, and are essential to understanding
the fundamentals of leading.
In 480 B.C.E. the ancient Persian king Xerxes I, the “King of Kings,” crossed the
Hellespont River from Anatolia into Macedonia and Greece with an army of (allegedly) over one
and a half million men, intending to finally conquer the Greek city-states who had for decades
resisted Persian domination.8 Militarily Xerxes I proved successful, famously defeating the three

“An Examination of Dialectic.” CalPolyPomona.edu, https://www.cpp.edu/~zding/teaching/3182/Dialectic.htm
8
John Lewis Gaddis. On Grand Strategy. (United States of America: Penguin Books, 2018), 1.
7
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hundred Spartans at Thermopylae and sacking Athens.9 Yet the victory rang hollow: the Greeks
had already evacuated Athens; Greece as a whole did not surrender; poor weather threatened to
wreck the Persian fleet. Xerxes’ massive army was now stranded in hostile territory with rumors
swirling of the Greek fleet targeting their only way home: the pontoon bridges that spanned the
Hellespont. Xerxes chose to flee before such an event, leaving his soldiers stranded, leaderless,
and easy pickings for the reinvigorated Greek armies. 10
In 1812 C.E. the French Emperor Napoleon crossed the Niemen River from Eastern Europe
into Russia with an army of over six hundred thousand men intending to defeat Tsar Alexander I
and force acquiescence to his “continental system”—an embargo against Napoleon’s British
nemeses. Napoleon’s campaign initially proved a success; his army swept through the Russian
countryside and occupied Moscow. However, he found himself far from home, facing daunting
weather, occupying an area with few supplies and even fewer friendly faces, and, perhaps most
importantly, having not secured a decisive victory. Thus, Napoleon made the humiliating, deadly
march back to his Empire, losing hundreds of thousands of men along the way.11
Xerxes and Napoleon’s struggles embodied many of the same potential pitfalls present in
Nasser’s nationalization. Their pursuit of ultimate objectives—conquering the known world,
securing the continental system, and putting an end to British Imperial influence in Egypt—
threatened to collapse under their own immense, aspirational weight. Xerxes, Napoleon, and
Nasser’s ends, in other words, threatened to outstrip their means. The acts of passing the Hellespont
and Nieman rivers for Xerxes and Napoleon respectively, and the international declaration of
nationalization for Nasser, both literally and metaphorically represent moments of crossing. These
There were, contrary to depictions in popular culture, far more than a mere three hundred Greek soldiers
defending the narrow pass.
10
Gaddis. On Grand Strategy, 11.
11
Gaddis. On Grand Strategy, 195.
9
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crossings, while manifesting quite differently for the first two leaders as opposed to Nasser,
represent crucial inflection points in their respective reigns. Xerxes and Napoleon never recovered
from their defeats; Xerxes never again threatened Greece, while Napoleon was forced into exile
and (despite a brief, hundred-day stint in 1815) never again laid eyes on his beloved France.
Nasser, uniquely, suffered not the fates of Xerxes or Napoleon. Rather, his crossing proved one of
triumph, cementing his place as the most important ideological voice of pan-Arab nationalism and
Middle Eastern decolonialism until his early death in 1970. The Suez Crisis, although possessing
the same capacity for ruination as did crossing the Hellespont or Nieman, instead stands as
Nasser’s greatest victory.

The Notable Exception
Nearly twenty-five hundred years after Xerxes crossed the Hellespont and over one
hundred and forty years after Napoleon crossed the Niemen, in Autumn 1956, Nasser’s crossing
beget similar grand strategic concerns stemming from grand aspirations. He nationalized the Suez
Canal, forcibly removed its British and French administrators, and jeopardized global trade and
geopolitical stability. His reasoning was two-fold.
Firstly, and most practically, the United States and the United Kingdom had retracted
funding for the Aswan Dam, an infrastructure mega-project that, upon completion, could regulate
the flow of the Nile and drastically improve agricultural output and stability in Egypt.12 Earlier in
1956, Nasser had agreed to purchase arms from Soviet-aligned Czechoslovakia, angering the

12

Keith Kyle. Suez. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).
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Anglo-American bloc and causing them to renege on their commitment to fund the dam.13 Revenue
from the Canal would replace Anglo-American financing.
Secondly, and primarily ideologically, Nasser sought to create and lead an independent
Arab republic composed of all Arab peoples, which necessarily required confronting and
eliminating European colonial influence in the region. Controlling the region’s most valuable, and
internationally visible, economic asset, especially at the expense of its colonial administrators,
would gain Nasser political clout in other Arab nations. The risks were great, however, and for a
time after he set the plan in motion, it appeared as if Nasser’s nationalization would end in failure
and ruin; Suez would be his Hellespont.
For Nasser had prodded the British Imperial lion. The British saw the nationalization as a
total affront to their waning imperial prestige and were prepared to make a stand in Suez. Public
relations advisor to PM Eden, William Clark, summarized the strict British position as such:
The sad fact is that in the present state of international law and order, nationalism, which
may destroy the world community’s interest, is sacrosanct and Nasser could get away with
theft before the UN. Equally, if Nasser does get away with it—in fact if Nasser is still
dictator of Egypt next year—the Eden Government is doomed and British (and probably
Western influence) in the Middle East is destroyed.14
Clark’s writings indicate that preserving British influence were the United Kingdom’s primary
objectives during the Suez Crisis. The British government believed that only through removing
Nasser from power could they accomplish this end. Secretly soliciting the Israelis to invade Egypt
as a ruse, the British and French conducted operation Musketeer, an attack on the canal that sought
to reestablish control with the covert aim of destabilizing Nasser’s grip on Egypt.15 The coalition

John Lewis Gaddis. The Cold War: A New History. (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 127
Kyle. Suez, 166.
15
Kyle. Suez, 167.
13
14
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secured a clear military victory, occupying the canal and ostensibly “separating” the two
belligerent powers (Egypt and Israel), attempting to cast the conflict as a peacekeeping mission.
However, within weeks Egypt (in particular Nasser) won a decisive political victory, as
international pressure— specifically from the United States and the Soviet Union— forced the
French, British, and Israeli forces to retreat from Egypt and return control of the Canal to Egypt’s
government. The prospects of the regional conflagration erupting into global, potentially nuclear,
war forced the two global superpowers to cooperate, a relatively rare occurrence in this era.
Nasser’s personal fame skyrocketed, with him becoming an influential figure not only in the
regional politics of the Middle East, but also in the wider Non-Aligned Movement that sought a
third option apart from American capitalism and Soviet communism. With a cult of personality
emerging around him akin to that of Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Fidel Castro, Nasser
cemented himself as the face of Egypt and wider Arab nationalism.16 Suez, rather than spelling his
doom, proved perhaps Nasser’s finest moment: a desert fox defeating the once-mighty British lion.
Suez presents a perplexing case for historians seeking to understand leadership through
crisis and conflict. Surely intervention from the US and USSR helped, but the US was a staunch
ally of Britain and the Soviets were by no means entirely supportive of Nasser’s Egypt, yet both
were united against the British-led coalition. Nasser somehow brought the world’s two
superpowers, engaged in a bitter rivalry that teetered on the verge of full-scale nuclear escalation
multiple times, together in a rare moment of cooperation and agreement. The Egyptian President,
however, is rarely remembered across time and space as an exceptionally skilled or influential

Henry Heller. The Cold War and the New Imperialism: A Global History, 1945-2005, (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 2005), 91-93.
16
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leader.17 Yet he succeeded where Xerxes and Napoleon could not: in realizing abstract, ultimate
ambitions.

Towards a Theory of Divergence
The fictionalized experience of Napoleon’s lesser-remembered adversary, general Mikhail
Kutuzov, during the invasion of Russia, described in Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace, offers a
historically grounded explanation for the divergence between Nasser and the other notable leaders.
Tolstoy writes:
[Kutuzov] understands that there is something stronger and more significant than his will—
the inevitable course of events—and he’s been able to see them, able to understand their
significance, and, in view of that significance, is able to renounce… his personal will and
direct it elsewhere.18
While Napoleon felt irrationally compelled by goals too large to realistically achieve at once,
Kutuzov remained focused on the reality of Russia’s situation. This adherence and attention paid
to his limited means allowed Kutuzov to more effectively determine the degree to which he could
meet his ends. A more proud or arrogant general may have attempted to engage Napoleon headon, forcing a decisive battle that the Russians could have easily lost. Kutuzov instead recognized
his ultimate goal was not necessarily to defeat Napoleon’s army on the battlefield, only to make
waging war so strategically impractical for the French Emperor as to force a retreat, which the
Russian general proceeded to do. Kutuzov used the circumstances—Russia’s vastness and frigidly
inhospitable winters—to his advantage. The Russian general, to paraphrase a lesson from Sun Tzu,
shaped his army to “resemble water,” avoiding Napoleon’s strengths and “strik[ing] his

For despite the failure of the United Arab Republic in 1961, it certainly existed for a time. Nasser himself
continued to rule until his death in 1970.
18
Gaddis. On Grand Strategy, 207.
17
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emptiness.”19 It is unknown if Nasser War and Peace or The Art of War, however he certainly
intuited the principles laid out therein.
Indeed, Nasser pounced on the British, who frequently ignored the turbulent conditions of
domestic and global opinion, impeding the once-proud Empire’s chances of their military
operation resulting in long-term strategic victory. Domestically the British were far from a unified
front. Despite early successes in stirring up pro-war sentiments, by late autumn 1956 British media
outlets and government officials frequently accused each other of blindly pro-British, antiEgyptian bias.20 By November, a significant portion of the British press had already uncovered
and publicized the secret collusion between Israel and the Anglo-French coalition, undermining
the Eden government’s narrative of the Suez operations as a peacekeeping mission.21 So great was
the failure of British propaganda and the success of Egypt’s that British General Keightly, in his
1957 post-mortem report on the Suez Crisis, bluntly stated:
The one overriding lesson of the Suez operations is that world opinion is now an absolute
principle of war and must be treated as such. However successful the pure military
operations may be they will fail in their object unless national, Commonwealth and
Western World opinion is sufficiently on our side.22
Britain, merely a score prior considered the most powerful empire on Earth, found itself shamed
and humiliated by Egypt, a nation that it had subjugated and controlled for over seven decades.
Nasser, sensing this weakness, masterfully manipulated and swayed world opinion to his
side. He accomplished this in part due to an unlikely and egregiously overlooked primary source.
The White Paper on the Nationalisation of the Suez Maritime Canal Company, published on
August 12, 1956, by the Egyptian government press in Cairo, has proven the subject of curiously
Gaddis. On Grand Strategy, 64.
Tony Shaw. Eden, Suez, and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis. (London: I.B.
Tauris, 1996), 117.
21
Shaw. Eden, Suez, and the Mass Media, 87.
22
Keightly, Charles. AIR 8/1940. United Kingdom National Archives, Kew.
19

20

16

The Chosen One?

Hobbs

little historical scholarship, yet is rife with vivid historical insights. It provides a single document
through which one can observe the confluence of an astounding number of historical processes at
work throughout the Suez Crisis—Britain’s imperial legacy, decolonial Egyptian nationalism,
Nasser’s leadership, and the waning tides of imperial power, to name a few. The brief pamphlet
proves the documentary embodiment of nationalism, charismatic leadership, and the tangible
historical agency of certain exceptional individuals. Through the White Paper, Nasser emerges as
an exceptionally significant historical figure, confirming the place individuals have in the creation
of history and as a product of both long-term and short-term historical processes His strategy
throughout the Suez Crisis, illuminated by the White Paper, points towards a better understanding
of his circumstances when compared to his British counterparts, the unconscious cooperation of
contemporary historical forces, along with no small measure of good fortune as the primary
reasons for Nasser’s success.
As an influential decolonial, revolutionary, and non-aligned leader Nasser is in company
with Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse Tung, and others, yet the Egyptian President is often
omitted from Western studies referencing those other leaders. Consider an excerpt from the
Pulitzer Prize winning work Leadership by American historian James MacGregor Burns on
revolutionary leaders: “Revolutions seem to produce first generations of leaders who not only
represent but embody the higher ends of the cause; who else could have led their revolutions than
Lenin, Mao, Bolivar, Castro, Ho Chi Minh?”23 Why is Nasser’s name not included here? The Suez
Canal and Egypt, if not quite as geopolitically significant as Russia and China, are certainly on par
with South America, Cuba, and Vietnam. Likewise, Xerxes and Napoleon are famously
remembered for the disastrous execution of their ambitious visions, yet Nasser is not-too-popularly

23

James MacGregor Burns. Leadership. (New York: Harper & Row,1978), 240.
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remembered (within Western circles) despite his resounding (but still flawed) success in achieving
his vision. This thesis seeks to illuminate Nasser’s role in the formation of Egyptian, Middle
Eastern, and global decolonial history. Through the lens of the Suez Crisis, one will observe both
the culmination of several long-term historical processes—and their embodiment in Nasser and
Egypt—and the emergence of a most peculiar sort of charismatic leader—a Raïs, as described by
historian Jean Lacouture—during the Crisis proper.24

Organization and Methodology
This thesis will be divided into two chapters. The first chapter, Long Causes, examines the
development of nationalism in England and Europe, its spread across the globe and subsequent
emergence in Egypt, and evolution into the potent, Nasserist cocktail known as pan-Arab
nationalism. Tracing nationalism’s long development frames Nasser’s struggle within one of the
most paramount interwoven histories of the modern era. That England originally “invented”
nationalism only to see its concept coopted by Egyptians (and Nasser) and used against them
proves one of history’s more potent ironies. It is primarily a synthetic effort, laying out debates
and summarizing the works of other scholars to establish the wider, long-term historical context
in which the Suez Crisis exists. It additionally draws on Nasser’s Philosophy of the Revolution, a
crucial primary source explaining Nasser’s political ideology in his own words.
The topic then shifts towards a more narratively driven discussion of British grand strategic
failure, Nasser’s leadership, and changes in the Cold War international system as the Short Causes
of the Suez Crisis. Chapter two will focus on the period immediately preceding the Suez Crisis

24

Jean Lacouture. Nasser: A Biography. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 149.
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along with the Crisis proper. The second chapter ties together the longer-developing threads of
nationalism and charismatic leadership into a contemporarily focused picture, examining the
singular, short-term advent of the Suez Crisis and its immediate causes and effects. While Nasser
himself is no doubt imperative to understanding the Crisis, this chapter extensively covers British,
American, and to a lesser extent Soviet, French, and international objectives, policy, and responses
throughout the event as well, ultimately tying it back to the central theme of discerning an
individual’s role in creating history. It will interrogate primary sources from the British National
Archives at Kew along with selections from Cold War and decolonial scholars.
Chapter two will additionally focus on the Egyptian White Paper, Livre Blanc, identifying
its significance, examining key arguments and legal documents, and exploring instances in which
the document presents examples of Nasser’s wider ideology and Egyptian national and social
history. The document, strangely understudied, possesses lasting significance in the interconnected
histories of the Cold War, nationalism, decolonization, and third-world charismatic leadership.
This portion of the thesis draws primarily from the White Paper itself, along with several pertinent
journal articles and contemporary scholarly works on relevant provisions of international law.

State of Literature
I.

Nationalism and National Identity in Egypt and the United Kingdom
Existing literature covers the history of nationalism regarding Egypt and the United

Kingdom in depth. Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism, Benedict Anderson’s Imagined
Communities, and Liah Greenfeld’s Nationalism: A Short History are several of the eminent
historical works on nationalism, providing analytical frameworks useful in examining the rise of
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Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism while, particularly in Greenfeld’s work, surveying the history of
nationalism as well.25 Gellner broadly argues that nationalism is primarily a cultural force
emerging from the technological and social upheaval of the industrial revolution, adding that the
democratization of high culture, literacy, and education precipitated the rise of a mass society as a
unitary socio-political force.26 Anderson famously conceived of a nation as “an imagined political
community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”27 Imagined in that no
member of a nation will ever know personally every other member. Limited because every nation,
no matter how vast, has defined boundaries. Sovereign due to the desire of nations to be free from
influences beyond their limited borders. And finally, community, or the overriding mentality that
members of a nation fundamentally have more in common with one another than they do with nonmembers. Greenfeld, meanwhile, contends that the fundamental characteristics of nationalism are
national consciousness, or the ability of a group of people to view themselves as a nation, and
democratic equality.28
Greenfeld devotes a great deal of Nationalism: A Short History to the development of
British national identity, as she argues it is the first instance of such a mentality in human history.
Stemming from a fifteenth-century feudal war between various aristocratic families in England,
many of whose supposedly “noble” bloodlines died out during the conflict, English national
identity formed, according to Greenfeld, out of a notion of equality among all English people
regardless of class.29 Greenfeld frames this as a pragmatic political tactic used to justify common

Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).; Benedict Anderson,
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folk or peasants ascending to ruling positions previously reserved for nobility. This view fostered
stronger political organization domestically, precipitating the notion of the British people as one
singular political entity. Soon, the British came to view other states as nations, fostering sentiments
of increased international competition in England and a tendency to act aggressively against other
perceived nations (although most states at the time did not yet view themselves as nations).30
Paul Gilroy, in his “One Nation under a Groove: The Cultural Politics of ‘Race’ and Racism
in Britain,” adopts a post-colonial, racial lens in analyzing British identity during and after
decolonization, arguing that as the Commonwealth broke up, notions of Britishness became far
more insular. He argues: “Nationalism and racism became so closely identified that to speak of the
nation is to speak automatically in racially exclusive terms.”31 While speaking towards primarily
white versus black racism, Gilroy’s argument could explain, in addition to economic and
geopolitical considerations, Britain’s insistence on maintaining control of the Canal. Handing over
the perceived lifeblood of the British economy to a foreign, non-white population could perhaps
have been a prospect unacceptable to many in the British government, supporting Greenfeld’s
characterization of the British as— perhaps irrationally— internationally competitive.
Hendrik Spruyt’s Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition
addresses British decolonization with a more political focus. Spruyt proposes that, due to a variety
of factors, pressure for decolonization on the British most often resulted in “calibrated withdrawal
[and] incidental conflicts.”32 He pragmatically argues that decolonization was an inexorable force,
unstoppable after anti-colonial forces achieved relative parity in technology and political
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organization.33 Nationalism often emerged in these nations prior to, or in conjunction with, fullfledged independence movements. Implicitly asserting the degradation of British imperial power,
Spruyt argues that after 1945, the United States pressured the British into accepting
“noncommunist nationalism” to ideologically combat the Soviets in the emerging Cold War.34
This shift in strategy, ironically, fostered a stronger focus on Suez as one of the few remaining
strongholds of British power, along with perhaps the most important economic asset to the
nation.35 But, following the Suez Crisis in 1956, Spruyt argues that British policy shifted again,
this time prioritizing Europe over formerly colonial parts of the world.36 One can hardly imagine
a more embarrassing retreat from the global stage for a power which once ruled over a quarter of
the world.

II.

Nasser’s Leadership
Nasser himself has drawn the attention of many historians who seek to understand and

analyze his impact on the Cold War, decolonialism, and his leadership style. Jean Lacouture’s The
Demigods: Charismatic Leadership in the Third World examines several “third world” leaders and
the science (or art, if one prefers) of leadership. Specifically, Lacouture analyzes Nasser’s rule in
Egypt, arguing that it illustrates a complex democratic give-and-take, in which the “masses”
bestow power on a strong individual so that he (in Nasser’s case) may construct the necessary
institutions that will eventually bequeath power back into the people’s hands. According to
Lacouture, Nasser took this power and made it his own, making himself and Egypt, for a time,
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inseparable, with the issues plaguing either party reflected in the other.37 That Nasser was the
individual chosen to lead Egypt was not a given; Lacouture illustrates the dispositions of the
Egyptian people towards accepting a charismatic, authoritarian leader through an anecdote told by
a famous Egyptian stage actor during the period of political upheaval following the abdication of
King Farouk in 1952: “Send me into the street in the general’s uniform I wore in my last play;
show me the Gardens of Ezbekieh and let me repeat the same speech there: I guarantee that Egypt
is mine!”38
Despite this predisposition towards any strong, authoritarian-leaning leader, over time
Nasser seems to have uniquely implanted himself in the Egyptian national consciousness. P.J.
Vatikiotis, a historian of Egypt who worked at the University of Cairo prior to Nasser’s rule, argues
in Nasser and His Generation (1978) that, titularly, Nasser had such a profound impact on
Egyptian society as to say that an entire population was his. As the prominent Egyptian writer
Tawfiq al-Hakim put it: “Nasser enjoyed greater power and adulation than any ruler of Egypt
before him… even the pharaohs.”39 Vatikiotis contends that this adulation stems from the
perception that Nasser satisfied the Egyptian people’s desire for a pseudo-prophetical, semimythical leader that would resurrect Egyptian society and return its pride and respect.40 Policy and
tangible achievements (positive or negative) did little to shake this constructed image of Nasser in
the eyes of everyday Egyptians.41 Broadly, Vatikiotis’ work argues for the effectiveness of “great
men” in history, wherein a single individual can radically alter the course of history.42 His focus
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on the psycho-social relationship between Nasser and his people, with whom Nasser often
conflated himself, has been praised by other historians.43
Thus, Nasser and the Egyptian nation prove difficult concepts to separate. Further, the
fervent sense of nationalism Nasser instilled in both Egypt and the wider Arab world defined the
lasting impact of his rule. Nasser’s Egypt would be nothing without citizens comprising the
Egyptian nation, and the Egyptian nation would not exist as it does today without Nasser.
Assessing histories of nationalism and its development, then, is crucial to understanding Nasser’s
reign as a whole. As Heraclitus stated earlier in this thesis, the one includes the many, and the
many composes the one.
Some historians view Nasser as an individual rising at the right time. P.J Vatikiotis, in
Nasser and His Generation, contemplates Nasser’s role in the modern Egyptian mythos, stating,
“Since heroes are not born, only constructed, he had the necessary qualities and opportunity, for
he appeared at the right coincidence of events and convergence of conditions the Egyptians needed
for their hero-making.”44 This falls in line with Tolstoy’s characterization of Kutuzov, as the savvy
opportunist, rather than the depiction of Xerxes or Napoleon, prisoners (during their respective
crossings, at least) of their own machinations. It also speaks in a more mystical, divine tone,
portraying Nasser as the savior of Egypt, albeit through action and skill rather than birthright.
Indeed, Vatikiotis continues that the Egyptian people bear significant responsibility for the rise of
Nasser, arguing that:
Together with post-war notions of integrative nationalism at a time of decolonization and
the retreat of Europe from Asia and Africa, the needs of Egyptian society were such as to
create a mood highly receptive to the radical exhortations and salvationist promises of a
new, young native ruler.45
Vatikiotis. Nasser and His Generation. Page 270; Zamora and Deane. “Nasser and His Generation by P.J.
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Perhaps this is a situation where having one is impossible without the other—the one is made up
of all things, and all things issue from the one—where Nasser chose to lead the Egyptian people,
and the Egyptian people chose Nasser to lead them. Nasser himself recognized his role as the sole
standard-bearer of the Egyptian people, responding to criticism from Western media outlets in an
interview with the Daily Herald in July 1956 by saying: “I don’t know, you must judge. Foreign
papers say I am a dictator, a Pharaoh. But a dictator is one who governs his country in spite of its
people. It is up to you to find out if this is so in my case.”46 Here Nasser implicitly derived his
right to rule through the consent of the governed (the Egyptian nation). Yet, for Egypt especially,
the relationship between a people and their leader proved far more complex, and possessing of
deep historical roots.
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Chapter 1
Long Causes

In the long-winded, narratively nebulous conclusion to his foundational work War and
Peace, author Leo Tolstoy ponders the ancient question of free will versus determinism in human
affairs and history. He finds it analogous to Newtonian physics, arguing:
When Newton formulated the law of gravity, he did not say that the sun or the earth has
the property of attraction; he said that all bodies, from the largest to the smallest, have this
property of attracting each other… History stands on the same path. And if history has for
its subject of study the movements of peoples and of mankind, and not the description of
episodes from people’s lives, it should set aside the notion of causes and seek for the laws
common to all the equal and inseparably bound together infinitely small elements of
freedom.47
In other words, just as every object possessing mass also possesses gravity (even to an infinitely
small extent), so too does every person, action, or event possess a degree of freedom from its
causes or initial positions. The world is, according to Tolstoy, if not entirely free from the effects
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of laws and causes, certainly not entirely deterministic either. Historian John Lewis Gaddis agrees,
adding that while there may be historical laws governing patterns and processes so minute that one
may never notice, this lack of awareness of the laws further cements the fact that freedom and free
will exist in history. “Our perception of freedom,” Gaddis writes, “is, in practice, freedom itself.”48
In this framework, it would seem as though the wider world can both influence individuals
via near undetectable laws and causes whilst the individual still maintains the agency to act and
affect the wider world. Surely, then, the evolution of the Egyptian nation informed Nasser, so that
Nasser was eventually able to guide and influence the Egyptian nation? Scholars have engaged in
rigorous debate on this general interplay between individual and society, along with the role of
nationalism as a mass movement, in many cases discussing Nasser specifically. A gap exists,
however, in bridging the study of Egyptian nationalism with the study of Nasser’s charismatic
leadership and individual role as a socio-political actor in Egypt’s history. The Suez Crisis here
represented a key moment of differentiation, resulting in both Nasser’s ascension to personal fame
and international prominence and Egypt’s ascension to a leading role in Middle Eastern and anticolonial politics.
This chapter of the study begins with an overview of the development of nationalism in
Europe, its spread across the globe, and leading conceptual theories of nationalism, providing
frameworks one can apply to the development of Egyptian nationalism. It then focuses on the roots
of Egyptian nationalism and pan-Arabism prior to the Free Officers’ revolution and Nasser’s rule,
arguing that the development of Egyptian nationalism and pan-Arabism indeed adhered to aspects
of the previously discussed conceptual theories of broader nationalism. Moving into an exploration
of Nasser’s regime following the 1952 revolution, this chapter will identify relevant theories of
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leadership and assess the degree to which a single individual can affect historical change,
juxtaposed with examples of Nasser’s own philosophy of leadership and history.
The conclusion to this chapter will tie this primarily theoretical, synthetic discussion of
nationalism, charismatic leadership, Egyptian and pan-Arab nationalism, and Nasser’s individual
agency into a more pointed, narratively driven study of the Suez Crisis proper as a standout
example of the confluence of the aforementioned processes, wherein chapter two will begin.

Exclusivity, (In)Equality, and the Emergence of Nationalism
Tracing the emergence of nationalism back to fifteenth-century England, Liah Greenfeld
argues that, due to a dearth of nobility because of civil war, the remaining members of the ruling
class sought a new alliance to maintain their grip on their fiefdoms: an alliance with the lower
classes.49 Still residing in a pre-industrial, feudal society, elites primarily divided society along
horizontal, class-based lines. Peasants comprised the vast majority of society, while a select ruling
class, so-called “blue bloods” for their supposed inherent superiority over the lower classes, made
up a far smaller percentage, forming the upper echelon of English society. Ernest Gellner’s figure
displaying societal makeup during this period can be found below:
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Figure 1. A general form of the social hierarchy in agrarian, feudal societies.50
Feudal English society imagined and exacerbated divisions where none existed to preserve
the status quo. Yet such a radical shift in the status quo in fifteenth-century England necessitated
a shift in strategy. The English aristocracy made a revolutionary concession, allowing the lower
classes to have a hand in ruling. To justify this change, rhetoric shifted towards egalitarianism and
equality rather than rigid social stratification. Between all members of the English nation, there
existed a mentality that all within were fundamentally the same.51 With this equality came the
opportunity for social mobility and destratification; people in such societies could choose, to an
extent, their lot in life, unbound by the confines of exceedingly rigid social hierarchies.52 While
numerous factors remained that hampered freedom and social mobility, including many within
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society itself, the root of individual agency and the antithesis of outside determinism forever
integrated itself with the concept of the nation.
Throughout the intervening centuries, and exponentially during the nineteenth century,
other Europeans forged their states into nation-states and, between 1815 and 1914, for the most
part avoided large-scale wars with one another. Instead, taking advantage of superior technologies,
economies, and political organization, Europeans acquired through force or coercion much of the
world as colonies.53 In these colonies Europeans extracted resources and revenue at a voracious
pace, but often ran into an issue similar to that faced by England in the fifteenth century: a numbers
dilemma. There were simply not enough Europeans to oversee the ever-growing colonial
bureaucracies. So Europe began educating colonial subjects, slowly and perhaps unconsciously
closing the technological, economic, and, perhaps most importantly, the political-ideological gap
between colonizer and colonized. The effective exporting of ideas from Europe to its colonies
brought about a similar, yet more unintended, consequence as that exhibited in England some four
hundred years earlier: there began to emerge in the colonized world a steadily-building sense of
national consciousness.54 This took different forms in different states and over different lengths of
time, yet in the long-term this often bore the same result: widespread, nationalist resistance against
European hegemony.
In contrast to Greenfeld’s characterization of European national emergence as (initially, at
least) inclusive and egalitarian, Ernest Gellner and Elie Kedourie argue that nationalism in
European colonies emerged out of opposite forces: exclusivity and inequality. Kedourie posits
that, rather than socially and politically elevating those who had achieved sufficient education,
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qualifications, and skills—as England had done during their national emergence—European
colonial administrators instead continued to subjugate all members of colonized populations.55 It
is unclear how one ought to interpret this statement, excerpted from Kedourie’s 1970 monograph
Nationalism in Asia and Africa, as Kedourie does not clearly explain whether or not he believes
the exclusivity and inequality present in European colonial systems is a disadvantage to ruling
colonies. Gellner, for his part, interprets Kedourie’s work as critical of such a system, believing
that the ideology of nationalism, beginning in Europe, spread across the globe with such ferocity
and staying power as to make any attempt to contain or eliminate it futile.56 Nationalism was, in
other words, a pandora’s box; once Europe succeeded in spreading it, it could not continue to
justify the subjugation of millions.57
Kedourie identifies theoretical inconsistencies in his 1970 work Nationalism in Asia and
Africa, criticizing scholars who further the notion that nationalism and nationalist revolt in colonial
states stems from conquest and occupation by systems of so-called “alien rule,” or a ruling class
composed of non-native groups. To say that alien rule alone is sufficient to cause nationalism in
these areas is, to Kedourie, to ignore thousands of years of history, such as the formation of the
Roman Empire, the United States of America, and even England, the original nation according to
several scholars.58 Kedourie cites a popular English poem by Daniel Defoe, in which he praises
ethno-cultural diversity as a foundational characteristic of the English nation, ironic to Kedourie
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considering that similar sentiments were responsible for the collapse of many British colonies.59
Instead, Kedourie posits that, among other factors, the radical social disturbance introduced to
traditional societies by Europe through its proliferation of ideals and mentalities during its colonial
period bears much of the blame for the seemingly exceptional brevity of European colonial rule
and rapid emergence of anti-colonial nationalism.60
So nationalism permeated the globe, latching onto and inciting nationalist movements in
most states on Earth, including Egypt. But what characteristics comprised a nation? How could
one determine whether they were part of one nation versus another? Framed in the context of
Europeans versus colonized peoples: what exactly differentiated members of, say, the Egyptian
nation from their British occupiers?
On this subject Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities bears considerable weight in
historical circles, continuing to be a seminal work on nationalism despite its relative age. Anderson
sees the Americas as a potential origin for peoples viewing nations in a geo-racial lens, a view that
came to dominate much of the globe throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Specifically referencing Spanish colonies and their metropole, Anderson notes that, should an
ethnic Spaniard have found himself born in Mexico City rather than Madrid during the period of
Spanish colonialism, he would forever be known as a creole, or an ostensibly ethnically European
borne in the Americas.61 Such a distinction would follow the man throughout his whole life, an
insurmountable strike against his European heritage. Likewise, and of interest in our study,
Anderson also notes that a person of Latin-American origin born in Spain at the time would forever
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be a peninsular, and could not have been a “true American.”62 One can understand nationalism in
this sense as, like observed by Gellner, an exclusive phenomenon.
Anderson continues that this geographic exclusion, throughout the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, blossomed into primitive notions of racism as well, further cementing the
idea of a nation as an ethnic community in addition to a geographic one.63 Europeans soon came
to view colonized peoples as distinctly different from, and inferior to, themselves simply because
of the latter’s ethnic and geographic differences.64 The inverse of this force, however, could
potentially explain the explosion of anti-European nationalism throughout the twentieth century.
Colonized peoples, influenced by European nationalist ideology, soon too viewed themselves as
different, but at the very least equal to, their European occupiers. With respect to this Anderson
sees a direct line of causation: his so-called “last wave” of nationalisms, those in Africa and Asia,
were originally formulated as responses to global European imperialism.65
In stark contrast to Anderson, social scientist Anthony Smith advances the idea of the
nation as both a real and constructed institution.66 Rather than Anderson’s idea of the nation as
entirely imagined, Smith argues that the nation arises from the formation of ethnies, or distinct
ethnic communities. These ethnies may be either artificially constructed—imagined—or, contrary
to Anderson, have genuine historical roots. In some cases, ethnies may comprise elements of
artificial construction and long-standing historical precedence.67 Specifically, these ethnies may
be either vertical or horizontally aligned. Vertical ethnies constitute a significantly stronger basis
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of nationhood, as it transcends social stratifications and barriers (hence the verticality).68 A
horizontal ethnie, in contrast, projects its rule across a wider breadth of space while sacrificing
socio-cultural unity.69 Smith offers the Armenians as an example of a vertical ethnie, possessing a
unified sense of identity across all social circumstances (including a strong diaspora community),
and the Normans as an example of a horizontal ethnie, believing their multi-ethnic state not
constitutive of a cohesive nation.70 Owing to his identification of the nation as at least partially
tangible in terms of longer-term historical legitimacy, some have argued that Smith rejects the
equating of Western and non-Western nationalisms.71
Greenfeld, Gellner, Kedourie, Anderson, and Smith examine wider patterns of nationalism,
despite their regional specialties primarily devoting their studies to the global phenomenon rather
than a deep exploration of nationalism in a single country. Do these broader theories hold up in
the case of Egyptian nationalism? Before delving into its impact on and subsequent cooption by
Gamal Abdel Nasser, this study first provides a brief history and summary of debates on the preNasser origins of Egyptian and pan-Arab nationalism.

The Roots of Egyptian Nationalism and Pan-Arabism
The roots of Egyptian nationalism and pan-Arabism remain nebulous. Some scholars see
continuity in independence movements dating to the period of Ottoman rule in Egypt and Arabia,
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while others, adopting a more Andersonian view, depict Egyptian and Arab nationalism as a
decidedly modern development.72 This study, primarily concerned with the advent of Egyptian
and Arab nationalism in the modern sense, as generally laid out by Greenfeld, Gellner, Kedourie,
and Anderson, does not attempt to resolve this debate. Rather, this study addresses the recent
history of Egyptian and Arab nationalism as it pertains to Nasser and the Suez Crisis; for all intents
and purposes, then, modern Egyptian nationalism begins in the early twentieth century, with
particularly noteworthy transformations occurring throughout the nineteen-twenties and thirties.
The emergence of nationalism and later pan-Arabism in Egypt presents at various points support
for the previously discussed theories of nationalism, and frame Nasser’s role in the evolution of
Egyptian and Arab identity as but one chapter, still possessing outsized importance, in a circuitous
lineage of national development.
Laurie Brand identifies two primary forces that influenced the development of the Egyptian
national mythos prior to 1952 and the ascension of Nasser: the often-conflicting legacies of
pharaonic and Islamic influence. Proponents of Egypt’s pharaonic legacy furthered the notion that
Egypt had once been sovereign and free from foreign meddling, offering an ancient example that
served to legitimize the concept of a modern Egyptian state—analogous to the philhellenist
movement that permeated much of Europe during the nineteenth century.73 This proto-nationalist
ideology was relatively secular in nature, and found adherents across the myriad religious, class,
and racial distinctions found in Egypt at the time. Just as Greek heritage provided romanticized
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memories of a common past to Europeans at the time, so too did ancient Egyptian memories prove
a unifying influence on contemporary Egypt in the early twentieth century.
Brand continues that this discourse shifted throughout the 1920s and 1930s from insular
and exclusively Egyptian ideas of nationhood to wider, Muslim and Arab-influenced
transnationalism, closer in line with what would become Nasser’s pan-Arabism. Arabic Language
and Islamic religion, Brand argues, became the primary binding factors in Egyptian society,
inextricably linking Egyptians both to one another and to the wider Arab world.74 In contrast,
Kedourie finds that Islam is the sole factor in the construction of Arabic nationhood, arguing that
the influence of Arab language in the Middle East stemmed directly from Muhammed and the
proliferation of Islam, succinctly stating: “without Islam, no Arab ‘nation.’”75 Leaving the dispute
over whether the Arabic language’s influence is due solely to Islamic influence for another study,
the fact remains that Egypt possessed the twin unifying factors of language and religion throughout
the early to mid-twentieth century, allowing first the Egyptian state to coalesce into a nation, then
for the nation to begin to view itself as a part of the wider Arab world.
However, some scholars disagree with such a clear-cut dichotomization of these two
ideological movements in pre-Nasser Egypt. Ralph Coury, in his two-part article “Who ‘Invented’
Egyptian Arab Nationalism?”, implicitly disagrees with Brand and explicitly with Kedourie by
arguing that the secular and Islamic nationalist forces in Egypt, exemplified by the Wafd party and
Muslim Brotherhood respectively, shared more in common than it initially seemed. Secondly,
Coury contends that the enflamed Arab nationalist sentiments among Egypt’s ruling class
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throughout the inter-war period reflect socio-political changes in Egypt and the wider Arab world,
rather than a resurgence in temporarily suppressed Islamist ideology.76
Coury cites the 1925 Syrian revolution against French colonialism as a watershed moment
in Egypt’s evolution towards a pan-Arabist state. During this conflict, the leader of the secular
Wafd party, Saad Zaghul, delivered impassioned speeches in favor of Syrian independence from
France, and advanced the idea of a shared Syrian-Egyptian identity, believing the two states were
bound by common geography, history, language, religion, and culture.77 In essence, Zaghul argued
for the existence of a common, pan-Arabic heritage and, perhaps implicitly, for a unitary Arab
nation.
Zaghul’s speeches inadvertently allude to Benedict Anderson’s definition of a nation,
specifically its imagined component; it is likely that a significant portion of the Egyptian populace
had little to no first-hand experience with Syria or the Syrian people, and yet Zaghul began to tie
the two nations together through invented notions of commonality. While such commonalities
certainly existed to a degree, the perception of commonality on the part of Egypt, existing primarily
in the minds of Egyptians, is essential in this instance, and supports Anderson’s theory of
nationalism.
Coury continues in the second of his two-part article that this sense of nationhood was in
fact novel and developed over time into a distinct pan-Arab nationalist ideology separate from
Islamic influence. Looking at contemporary linguistics, Coury notes that throughout the nineteentwenties and thirties Egyptians and Middle Eastern peoples came to use the term “Arab,” once
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reserved for the nomadic Bedouin peoples, to describe all Arabic speakers.78 Coury believes this
to be either a conscious effort at reeducation by Arabic leaders or a transition in nationalist
sentiments through which Arabic leaders were themselves passing.79 While this question of
intentionality takes on elevated relevance in this study’s discussion of Nasser, in this particular
instance, in either case, the shifting meaning of the word “Arab” was emblematic of the wider
pattern of a rapidly coalescing pan-Arabic identity.
This assessment both consciously and implicitly alludes to Benedict Anderson’s
description of the development of “print-capitalism” in Europe throughout the enlightenment: a
process he argues in large part established the conditions for modern nationalism. Supporting his
assertion of the nation as an imagined community, Anderson asserts that print media, massproduced in Europe by the sixteenth century—and steadily increasing in popularity in Egypt and
the Arab world throughout the nineteen-twenties and thirties—allowed individuals to develop
more nuanced images of others in their society, over time contributing to a wider sense of national
solidarity.80 Coury further teases out the connection, believing that the export of cultural
products—books, newspapers, and other print media—from Egypt to the rest of the Arab world
not only fostered a sense of Egyptian nationalism, but Egyptianized Arab national identity as
well.81 Already, then, Egypt began to take on a leadership role in general Arab affairs, a role that
Nasser intentionally sought to not only maintain but expand. Moreover, Anderson’s theory
proposing the significance of uniform cultural imaginings stemming from universal print media
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consumption seems congruent with the development of early-twentieth-century Egyptian and panArab nationalism.
However, Coury’s arguments and the applicability of Anderson’s theory are not universally
accepted. Reviewing Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski’s two-part work Redefining the
Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945, Charles Smith challenges the authors’ imposition of both Anderson’s
and Anthony Smith’s nationalist theories on the specific history of Egyptian nationalism, arguing
quite harshly that Gershoni and Jankowski’s work refutes rather than proves those theories.82
Gershoni and Jankowski essentially argue that Egyptian cultural nationalism, represented first
through Pharaonism and subsequently through blanket Islamic-Arabism, is, throughout the
nineteen twenties-through-forties, synonymous with Egyptian territorial nationalism, forming the
ideology of “supra-Egyptianism.” The combination of the two ideologies emphasized the shared
Muslim-Arab heritage of much of the Middle East, while implicitly asserting Egypt’s role as a
leader in regional affairs—in that sense proving a predecessor of Nasser-era pan-Arab nationalism
The authors then suggest that supra-Egyptianism as a result did not consider historical or
contemporary Egyptian territorial boundaries when constructing their notions of Egyptian national
identity.83
C. Smith identifies Anderson and Anthony Smith’s theories of nationalism as particularly
influential in Geshoni and Jankowski’s work, yet criticizes their application therein. Specifically,
C. Smith contends that the authors’ usage of Anderson’s theory serves more as a shaky
confirmation of preexisting ideas rather than a critical comparison of the theory’s viability in the
specific instance of Egyptian nationalism. Turning to Anderson, and implicitly Coury’s, assertion

82
83

C. Smith, “Imagined Identities,” 610.
C. Smith, “Imagined Identities,” 611.

39

The Chosen One?

Hobbs

of the significance of print culture and print capitalism, C. Smith sees little correlation between
theory and practice; he notes that Anderson believed print culture to create “languages of power,”
as seen in the widespread proliferation of common-language pamphlets and books in
enlightenment Europe. However, in Egypt print capitalism failed, according to C. Smith, to
produce the same effect. Rather, it simply reaffirmed the power of the Arabic language as a cultural
and religious force. 84 Additionally, the two authors, according to C. Smith, misconstrue A. Smith’s
concept of the ethnie, contradictorily arguing that the same Egyptian ethnie that adopted a
Pharaonist ideology entirely eschewed it for an supra-Egyptian, proto-pan-Arabist concept within
the span of two decades.85 C. Smith observes a contradiction in that A. Smith’s conceptual ethnies
cannot evolve into another, separate ethnie, rather that any ethnie’s journey must necessarily end
in the formation of a nationalist movement. Further, ethnies are by definition insular constructions,
meaning an ethnie whose central tenets are transnational in nature is illogical in A. Smith’s
conceptual framework.86 C. Smith would also disagree with Kedourie, who primarily credited
Europe with the proliferation of nationalism across the globe. Instead, C. Smith sees pre-modern
historical evidence for Pharaonism, arguing that despite its apparent invention in the nineteentwenties, it was not entirely modern nor entirely inspired by Europeans.87
Michael Doran assesses the roots of pan-Arabism prior to Nasser’s rule in his aptly, if
dryly, titled Pan-Arabism before Nasser. Doran, adopting a wider lens compared to previously
discussed scholars, contends that Nasser-era pan-Arabism emerged from a relatively
uncontroversial vision of the regional order established during the reign of King Farouk.88 This
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regional order placed Egypt at the forefront of Middle Eastern affairs, naturally bringing them into
conflict with the waning British Empire. The 1948 war with Israel—the point at which the study
concludes—defined the shape of things to come: that Egypt was prepared to assert its national will
in pursuit of its vision of regional politics.89 Doran paints a vivid picture of Egyptian foreign policy,
primarily focusing on the post-World War II period prior to a full British retreat. The two main
political factions, the secular-nationalist Wafd and Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, along with
numerous smaller parties, at this time adopted a uniquely aligned stance; Doran contends that
despite all other divisions, these factions were exceptionally united on an anti-imperialist,
staunchly nationalist stance against the British and, in soon to be less than hushed tones, the
British-backed monarchy. Moreover, these factions were composed of a new generation of
Egyptians, who grew up around, accustomed to, and expecting an ever-loosening British grip on
the nation.90 It is no wonder then that Nasser, eighteen at the time of the transformational AngloEgyptian treaty of 1936 and in university throughout the formative late nineteen-thirties, was a
part of this generation.
Although it may have drawn Charles Smith’s ire, history bore out the fact that many welleducated, young Egyptians flocked to nascent nationalist, Islamist, and fundamentalist political
parties during this time, having voraciously consumed the blossoming Egyptian print culture of
the day. One could walk into a bookstore or newsstand in Cairo and walk out with Muhammed
Heikal’s essays on the French Revolution and Rousseau, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi’s Islamic
Nationalist The Nature of Tyranny, the latest issue of the Wafd’s al-Jihad, Hafez Ibrahim’s
nationalist poetry, or even Egyptian-written, Arab-language biographies of such monumental
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historical figures as Napoleon, Alexander, Caesar, and Hannibal.91 Anderson’s concepts of print
culture and print capitalism, then, while perhaps not essential in the initial emergence of Egyptian
and Arab nationalism in Egypt, are no doubt crucial understanding in the processes’
popularization.
Additionally, the two most prominent forces in Egyptian nationalist politics, the Wafd and
Muslim Brotherhood, embodied the ideological split between proponents of secular nationalism,
influenced by the Pharaonic legacy, and the Islamist sect. Both parties, though, were strongly
aligned against British influence and furthered visions of a Middle Eastern regional order
dominated not by European empires, but Egyptian leaders. During this period, the fundamental
tenets of Egyptian nationalism adopted expansion and an exceptionalist quality: Egyptian
nationalists, such as Zaghul, viewed Egypt as a natural steward of the rest of the Arab world.
Coury’s identification of Egypt as an exporter of cultural nationalism during this period illustrates
the nation’s role, conscious or otherwise, as a leader in its region.
Likewise, the spread of European notions of national identity and community, such as those
theorized by Gellner and Kedourie, further twisted and iterated by internal Egyptian forces,
established a national consciousness accepting of, and demanding, change and total independence.
Anthony Smith’s comparatively rigid definition of an ethnie is not the most useful concept to
understand this pattern. Rather, a more pragmatic coalition formed; Egypt, owing to its position as
a nation possessing both a storied ancient history along with a world-religious population
ethnically similar to its neighbors, developed conceptions of nationhood influenced by both
Vatikiotis. Nasser and His Generation, 28. This characterization of Egyptian society stands in direct contrast
with Charles Smith’s criticisms of numerous authors’ application of Anderson’s theory. Vatikiotis’ seminal
work was published prior to Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1978 versus 1983), meaning that any
conclusions drawn by Vatikiotis could not have been influenced or biased by having read Anderson’s work.
In fact, Vatikiotis’ history would reinforce the significance Anderson places on print culture in the
development and, in this instance, proliferation of nationalism.
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domestic and international factors. In other words, if an ethnie is a solely insular construction, the
Egyptian nation does not qualify as one during this period.
Ultimately, the national self-conception as a unified, if diverse, and expansionist, if not
imperialist, power did not only emerge during Nasser’s reign. Its roots extend decades prior,
spiraling ever closer towards visions of full independence and regional power-wrangling from the
moment the British ended their formal occupation in 1922. Popular perceptions of Egyptian history
and the European ideology of nationalism informed Egypt’s unique Pharaonic legacy, which,
along with the regional influence of general Islamic nationalism, coalesced into a potent
ideological cocktail of anti-imperial, Arab-focused, Egyptian exceptionalist nationalism that
Nasser would incorporate into his Pan-Arab nationalist ideology.

Nasser’s Revolutionary Leadership, Egyptian Nationalist Legacy, and the Winds of History
Mohamed Heikal declared the conclusion to The Cairo Documents, an account of Nasser’s
relations with numerous world leaders and statesmen, “An Epilogue to an Era.”92 He writes almost
nostalgically of the time when world leaders “were men of a certain character, of what came to be
called, too glibly, ‘charisma.’”93 He argues that true leadership was quickly going out of fashion;
anonymous technocrats now governed the world, not magnetic personalities.94 Where leaders once
represented individuals who fought their way to the top through war, revolution, or regular political
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sparring and maintained a readily identifiable public image, the “new” wave of influential actors,
such as Henry Kissinger, ruled through bureaucracy and by-passing open political challenges.95
Esoterically, this development seemingly ushered in the “end” of individual agency in history,
instead granting agency to committees and collectives. Yet, Heikal’s observation echoes across
time; others temporally distant from the Egyptian journalist too have noticed a shift away from
individualism and towards what this study terms the concept of “collective determinism” or the
progression of history through movements and processes larger than, and uncontrollable by, any
single individual. However, collective determinism, while not without its merits, does not
adequately account for the demonstrable capacity of individuals to profoundly affect and alter
history. Nasser proves both a product of these macroscopic “winds of history” and a contributor
to their creation.
Returning first to Tolstoy’s War and Peace, wherein the author’s ruminations on “great
men” provide an influential, often critical basis for the modern study of leadership and the
influence of individuals on history—in line with collective determinist thought. Tolstoy writes
that,
In historic events the so-called great men are labels giving names to events, and like labels
they have but the smallest connection with the event itself.
Every act of theirs, which appears to them an act of their own will, is in an historical sense
involuntary and is related to the whole course of history and predestined from eternity.96
Tolstoy here argues in favor of the “winds of history,” so-to-speak, or that patterns and processes
inform the course of human events far more than could a single individual. The misconception of
history as mere stories of individuals, evident in the makeup of the word “history” itself, frustrates
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Tolstoy. Such oversimplification, to the author, risks compromising the field’s use as a tool for
understanding and predicting human behavior. He continues,
‘But every time there have been conquests there have been conquerors; every time there
has been a revolution in any state there have been great men,’ says history. And, indeed,
human reason replies: every time conquerors appear there have been wars, but this does
not prove that the conquerors caused the wars and that it is possible to find the laws of a
war in the personal activity of a single man. Whenever I look at my watch and its hands
point to ten, I hear the bells of the neighboring church; but because the bells begin to ring
when the hands of the clock reach ten, I have no right to assume that the movement of the
bells is caused by the position of the hands of the watch.97
So by confusing the wider historical patterns as mere actions of leaders, or so-called “great men,”
people lose sight of the forces guiding history. Tolstoy’s sentiments here foster a distinctly
deterministic view of human history—minimizing the influence of individual historical agency
and contradicting views he himself expressed to open this chapter.
Yet Tolstoy perhaps misconstrues the role of “great men” in history. Granted, they may be
servants to grandiose ideologies or abstract historical laws unintelligible to any one person, but
why should that preclude them from making an outsized impact on history? Determinism to
Tolstoy indeed begets larger historical forces, imperceptibly influencing the vast majority of
individual human actors. However, by the author’s own admission certain individuals,
subconsciously or otherwise, perceive these patterns.98 Surely, if beholden to “inseparably bound
together infinitely small elements of freedom,” such leaders throughout history have acted as
conduits for movements greater than themselves. And while the sentiments they espoused may
have proven beyond the realm of precise comprehension, individuals, even if they functioned as
pure mouthpieces, as Tolstoy would argue, could not help but further their own relatively narrow
interpretation of unknowable historical forces. Such is the nature of synthesis; one cannot
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physically, mentally, or intellectually express the entire breadth of any subject, so they must choose
certain characteristics to emphasize.
Nasser quite helpfully synthesized his worldview into The Philosophy of the Revolution.
Published in 1954, the hastily compiled manifesto sought to clearly define and elaborate the
President’s vision for the future of Egypt. However, Nasser begins with the past, “to discover who
we are and what our role is to be in the succeeding stages of Egypt’s history.”99 His rhetoric assents
to Tolstoy’s characterization of “great men” in history, as vicarious vessels through which larger
processes act. Nasser rhetorically wonders of both himself and the entire Egyptian people:
When was the day on which I discovered the seeds of revolution within me? The truth is
that these seeds were not only hidden in me; I found them also in the hearts of a great many
others, who in turn could not pinpoint the beginnings of their existence. Is it not clear then
that these seeds were implanted in us when we were born, and that they were a hope
concealed in our subconscious, put there by the generation before us?100
From this one observes the dichotomy embodied by Nasser—one that would come to embody all
of Egypt as a result—and the centrality of revolutionary ideology in constructing his modern
Egyptian national mythos. Nasser clearly cites the influence of previous national and revolutionary
movements in creating the conditions for his contemporary struggle.101 He continues:
I am one of those who believe that nothing can exist in a vacuum; even truth cannot so
exist. Truth is that which we feel and know in our hearts to be right, or to be more exact,
that which our souls embrace. Our souls are the vessels in which everything we are is
contained; and everything we are, everything placed in these vessels, must take their shape,
even truth. I try as much as humanely possible to prevent my soul from altering the shape
of the truth very much, but how far can I succeed?... I want to be fair to myself and fair to
the philosophy of the revolution. So I leave it to history to draw up its outlines as I see
them, as others see them, and as they are demonstrated by events—and then to distill from
all this the full truth.102
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Nasser’s words harken back to Tolstoy’s, presenting his actions as “predestined from eternity” and
himself as a mere automaton that may take action only once filled (by some esoteric force) with
the truth. Yet he, unlike Tolstoy, recognizes the bias inherent in such a process. For one cannot
express the whole truth; despite their best efforts they unconsciously distort and corrupt it. But one
can express their truth—the truth about which Nasser speaks. By appealing to history, Nasser
acknowledges that, while his ideology and vision purport to be superior to pre-existing ones, such
an assertion can only be proven by the passage of time. Nasser essentially argues for an experiment
of sorts: a test of the new order versus the old. Society is the independent variable. Historical
perception is the dependent variable. Even with such incredibly large-scale instruments of analysis,
he who conducted the experiment is still crucial in determining its outcome.
Historian James Burns writes extensively on the art of leadership and, in contrast to
Tolstoy, the profound role of (certain) individuals in history. Of interest to this study is his analysis
of revolutionary leadership. Burns argues that revolutions necessitate societal conflict, and that the
origins of such conflict must, at least in theory, reflect the will of the populace to change a
fundamental characteristic of the society in which they live. The leader, to Burns, understands the
crux of the population’s frustration, perhaps even before the population itself, and can rouse them
to action when the moment beckons.103 Further, revolutionary conflict begets the movement of
individuals or systems towards normative extremes; the old leader is wholly evil; the revolutionary
leader is wholly good. This allows the population to easily observe and delineate the “right” and
“wrong” sides, even if those two descriptors are entirely constructed. The essence of revolutionary
leadership, in Burns’ own words, is “the raising of social and political consciousness on the part
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of both leaders and followers.”104 In other words, successful revolutions replaced an older
worldview with a newer, ostensibly more refined one. The leader observes grand inconsistencies
in their current society, and through radical change seeks to reconcile them. Burns writes that “the
cardinal responsibility of leadership is to identify the dominant contradiction at each point of the
historical process and to work out a central line to resolve it… Leaders are not pale reflectors of
major social conflicts; they play up some, play down others, ignore still others.”105
To Nasser, the central contradiction lay in the conflict between the “millstones” of the socalled two revolutions. “Every people on earth,” Nasser writes, “goes through two revolutions: a
political revolution by which it wrests the right to govern itself from the hand of tyranny, or from
the army stationed upon its soil against its will; and a social revolution, involving the conflict of
classes, which settles down when justice is secured for the citizens of the united nation.”106 The
aspirations of these two revolutions are diametrically opposed; the political revolution seeks to
immediately unite the populace against an easily identifiable, morally simplistic enemy from
without—moving towards normative extremes. Nasser’s “tyrant” likely represents King Farouk,
while the mention of the army refers to the era of Britain’s “soft” occupation of Egypt from 19221952. The social revolution, on the other hand, uproots existing values and principles, sowing
discord amongst a society’s inner workings; it causes “us to hate each other and think only of
ourselves.”107
Yet these revolutions occur in tandem, demanding simultaneously a united front against
tyrannical, in this case foreign, aggression and radical upheaval of existing domestic social
structures. Nasser, identifying and constructing this dualistic revolutionary ideology, proudly
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offers his central line to resolve it. Caught between a revolution “which obliges us to unite in one
phalanx and to forget the past, and… another revolution which demands that we restore lost dignity
to our moral values by not forgetting the past,” Nasser proposes that “our only salvation lies... in
maintaining our speed of movement and our initiative, and our ability to travel through two
revolutions simultaneously.”108 The Egyptian leader, then, sought to toe a careful line between
unity and discord, holding opposing ideological goals in his own, and Egypt’s, consciousness.
“Salvation,” as it were, would necessarily be achieved by one with the ability to rapidly adjust to
and pragmatically resolve unforeseen contradictions in the two revolutions; to succeed, Nasser
needed to become, at least in part, a fox (to borrow historian John Lewis Gaddis’ verbiage).
Gaddis, eschewing the dense, conceptual prose of Burns, instead offers narratively driven
lessons and ruminations on leadership across time and space. He recounts the life of Isaiah Berlin
(1909-1997), a political scientist, historian, and philosopher who reinvented the theory of the “fox
and the hedgehog” in modern times. While attending a high-class London dinner party, Berlin,
who had a penchant for conversation and learning from others, met the 2nd Earl of Oxford and
Asquith, who relayed to him an intriguing line from the Ancient Greek poet Archilochus of Paros.
It read: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”109 This excerpt
prompted Berlin to investigate the nature of how people construct and synthesize their perception
of the world. In his 1953 The Hedgehog and the Fox, Berlin elaborated on the differences between
the two groups of people. Hedgehogs, he said, “relate everything to a single central vision [where]
all that they say and do has significance.”110 Foxes, conversely, “pursue many ends, often unrelated
and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way.” 111 The two philosophies,
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to Berlin, represented entirely different manners through which one viewed the world. Either every
pattern, process, and event connected via a unified point of reference (to a hedgehog), or
connections between such observations proved trivial and contrived (to a fox).
Berlin applied this theory to War and Peace specifically, arguing that the literary leviathan
lost itself in the minutia of peculiarities, details, and descriptions that defy theory and manifest
contradiction. These contradictions, apparent even in the comparatively few excerpts cited in this
study—the version of the book used presently runs two-thousand five-hundred-twenty pages, after
all—appeared to Berlin emblematic of a mind broken from years of attempting to reconcile the
two philosophies.112 Hedgehogs and foxes illustrate conceptually the ever-present contradiction
between theory and practice. Hedgehogs prefer theories, forcing reality to conform to their highminded ideological principles; Xerxes, when presented with the need to transport his armies over
the natural obstructions of Hellespont river and Athos peninsula, chose to bridge the river and cut
a canal through the peninsula, enforcing his supposed dominance over the surrounding
environment.113 Foxes, on the other hand, rely entirely on the circumstances of the present,
constantly shifting attention to any number of simultaneous, often competing objectives; Xerxes’
advisor during the Peloponnesian campaign, Artabanus, frequently became paralyzed by
indecision, attempting to prepare for every eventual calamity and failing to see if and how those
events related.114
Gaddis and Berlin’s philosophy of leadership was therefore predicated on reconciling
contradictions and balancing the often simultaneous, conflicting impulses of hedgehogs and foxes.
A great leader must be able to see the horizon, keeping his objectives in mind, while also
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maintaining the aptitude and awareness to maneuver around nearby obstacles and challenges that
inevitably arise along the way. Essentially, it is sometimes impossible to reconcile and live without
all contradictions, “and learning to live within that condition—let’s call it history—requires
adaptation to incompatibles.”115 Gaddis ultimately believes that true leadership involves aligning
potentially infinite ends with physically limited means; Xerxes, even if possessing an infinitely
strong will, could not have become the impossibly ambitious “King of Kings” due to the physical
bounds of reality.116 Those leaders who, unlike Xerxes, keep these guiding principles in mind, to
Gaddis, tend to remain examples of positive leadership throughout time, only able to implement
their beneficial visions for humankind so long as they are mindful of these larger “laws” of history.
Jean Lacouture would likely describe this sort of leader as “chosen by history.” The
predisposition of this sort of person to “feel” the winds of history bellowing at his or her side and
to not take actions that force them to go against it to Lacouture necessitate a figure who “is shaped
more by events than his convictions.”117 Lacouture believes Nasser fit into this category, writing
that he seemed “a cautious prophet chosen at the nth hour and who would have preferred to be a
raïs rather than a zaïm, to play the cards rather than merely deal them. But once he became a
symbol, how quickly he made up for the period of hesitation!”118 Interestingly, Lacouture draws a
distinction between raïs, Arabic for “president” or “malik,” and zaïm, Arabic for “leader.” This
would imply that Nasser displayed more of a predilection towards concrete, institutionalized power
Gaddis concludes On Grand Strategy with a criticism of Robert Kennedy’s claim that the United States
should not be proud of the territory it took from Mexico in the Mexican-American War. Considering the
alternative, giving the territory back, Gaddis believes that most Americans would not, “for satisfying the
claims of justice in this instance would not only disrupt the present and the future, but also the past:
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rather than a more nebulous, socially constructed power dynamic. Indeed, Lacouture points
towards Nasser’s Islamic faith as further evidence of this sentiment. He describes three Islamic
concepts associated with authority: hukm, beya, and ijma. Hukm represents the individual
characteristic of authority bestowed upon individuals by God. The beya, or oath of faith, sanctions
this, solidifying the sentiment within the individual. Finally, the authority is subject to ijma, or the
consensus of the people, positive or negative.119 Lacouture argues that, to Nasser, hukm and beya
“almost always” supersede ijma.120
The concepts of hukm and beya adhere to sociologist Max Weber’s theory of charismatic
leadership and extraordinary individuals. Weber famously defines “charisma” in his seminal work
Economy and Society as:
a certain quality of individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary
and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional
powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are
regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual
concerned is treated as a “leader.”121
Nasser’s Islam-informed hukm, drawing “exceptional powers or qualities” from God, fits this
description of charisma; Weber specifically mentions such characteristics’ perceived “divine
origin.” In other words, leaders possessing these qualities cannot avoid their natural ability to
attract, carry, and convince an audience. This sort of leader, according to Weber, generally comes
from a society’s elite or ruling class—only there might one be able to effectively wield the
instruments of change.122 Weber argues powerful ideas, rather than material power, behoove this
revolution from the top. Citing the 1905 Russian revolution as an example, Weber states that:
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This example is evidence of what the power of an ‘idea’ which unites the classes, and the
cooperation of broad strata of the bourgeoisie can achieve, and how little [the alleged
material indispensability of the workers] can achieve without that uncertainty in the
established cadres of the existing social order which is brought about by such cooperation
among bourgeois elements.123
The same principles Weber lays out above apply to Nasser’s Free Officer Revolution in 1952, a
revolution led by a group of officers in the Egyptian military that swept across the nation, deposing
King Farouk. The revolution there, as Weber posited, stemmed from the top, albeit with no clear
identification of an individual ringleader (although Nasser would in time establish himself as
such). Nasser and the Free Officer’s philosophy, combining the forces outlined in the previous
section (see pages 42 and 43), widely appealed to the Egyptian nation, enabling their success in
securing power while adhering to Weber’s theory of charisma and revolution.
Despite his emergence as the head of the Free Officers, Nasser ironically distanced himself
from the term “leader” in Philosophy of the Revolution. Describing the predicament faced by
Revolutionary Egypt and the Arab World following the removal of King Farouk, Nasser believes
there to be a “role, wandering aimlessly in search of a hero.”124 “This role,” Nasser continues, “is
not one of leadership. It is rather a role of interaction with and responsibility to all the abovementioned factors.”125 Here Nasser appears to intuit Gaddis’ lessons in leadership; he grounds
himself in principles and history. The “above-mentioned factors” reference the preceding
subchapter Geographical Limits, an exploration of Egypt’s unique location and its status as an
intersectional power, at the junction of the Arab World, Africa, the Middle East, and the Islamic
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World.126 So while Nasser’s principles may have differed from Gaddis’ in their more temporally
and geographically restricted nature, the overriding lesson remained the same: to keep one’s ends
within means by way of looking back at history.
Nasser’s Islamic, conservative upbringing engrained in him the Muslim notion of authority,
conjuring a more cosmic ideology of leadership, based on fundamental, immutable qualities that
individuals either possess or lack. His observation of the centrality of Egypt’s role in overlapping
worlds and the not-at-all veiled call to action implies a different sort of historical collectivism: that
of the convergence of patterns in a specific time and place and the need to act on it. One need not
possess Weberian “exceptional” or “superhuman” characteristics; they need only be able to
observe the path of history and offer a compelling vision for its future.

Lighting the Fuse
Nasser personifies this balance between individual agency and the collective winds of
history. His pan-Arab ideology, evident in Philosophy of the Revolution, is but the latest form of
a process possessing old sources. Nationalism, initially a fundamentally European idea, spread
across the globe, adopting new meaning to people such as members of the Wafd Party and Muslim
Brotherhood. These factions and more fomented the modern beginnings of Egyptian Arab
nationalism through a print culture that concretized the nebulous concepts of an Egyptian ethnie,
eventually coalescing into a nation with roots, contrary to many nations, both domestic and
international. Once firmly in power, Nasser took up the reigns of these early reformers, coopting
Egyptian Arab nationalism and advancing its cause under a new name: pan-Arabism. He
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accomplished this through a primarily intuitive philosophy of leadership, sensing the winds of
history swirling around him and building a sailboat upon which he could ride them.
The Egyptian nation bears a strong resemblance to Nasser’s own path through history. As
Nasser himself said, the task he saw Egypt facing was “a role such as to spark this tremendous
power latent in the area surrounding us; a role tantamount to an experiment, with the aim of
creating a great strength which will then undertake a positive part in the building of the future of
mankind.”127 The conditions from which modern Egypt emerged as a nation, therefore, left a gap
of agency and responsibility that only an active society could advance. At the center of that society,
microscopically, there existed a gap large enough for only one; only a single individual could
occupy the role Egypt left for him. The only thing keeping Egypt from realizing its potential as
leader of the Arab world was filling the leadership gap in society; it needed only a fuse to be lit.
By the end of 1956, as British soldiers withdrew from the Suez Canal Zone, not a soul in
Egypt, nor the Middle East, nor the world at large doubted that Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser fit
that role, filled that gap, and through his own will, meticulously well-executed statecraft, and good
fortune, led the Egyptian people towards their presumptive collective destiny.
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Chapter 2
Short Causes

What Nasser accomplished during the Suez Crisis presents an enduring and eminently
significant example of superbly effective leadership in a pressing domestic and international
emergency. The Egyptian President ushered the British Empire to (in the eyes of many scholars)
its ignominious end. His understanding of the prevailing international system enabled him to tilt
the balance of power in his favor, expertly manipulating international opinion and playing the two
global superpowers off one another and against the Anglo-French coalition. Through these efforts
he catapulted himself and his nation to regional supremacy; Nasserism, as his pan-Arab nationalist
ideology came to be known, spread across the Arab world, tangibly manifesting itself in the
formation of the United Arab Republic, a (shortlived) union between Egypt and Syria, in 1958.
The Suez Crisis exhibited that a potent mixture of nationalism and charismatic leadership could
result in radical regional change with global geopolitical implications. The event, in particular
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Nasser’s leadership throughout, maintains an indispensable role in the interconnected histories of
decolonial movements, the Cold War, and the development of global nationalism.
This chapter will begin with an examination of Britain’s shifting national identity and the
British and American positions in the Middle East in the early 1950s before delving into their
policies during the Suez Crisis proper. 128 The following section will detail broader Cold War
geopolitics and ideology, identifying the role of the Soviet Union and other international powers.
The next section addresses the international legal debate, described in minutes on the floor of the
UN, the documents governing the Canal’s operation, and the Egyptian government’s White Paper
on the Canal’s nationalization. Finally, the chapter concludes with a final assessment of Nasser’s
individual role in instigating the Suez Crisis, and his personal culpability for its myriad
consequences in Egypt, the Middle East, and the world at large.
The Suez Crisis shook the already rocky foundations of European empires, namely the
British and the French. European colonialism and imperialism, having weathered significant blows
in both World Wars, had begun to decline long before 1956.129 In fact, scholars have argued that
global imperial enterprise, while previously serving primarily to make metropoles extravagantly
wealthy, during the post-World War II era functioned as “essential for the smooth running of
Western capitalism.”130 Britain and France, in other words, had become dependent on their
imperial holdings for economic stability following World War II. The United States too propped
up much of Western Europe, including Britain and France, via economic support initiatives such
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as the Marshall Plan and general access to financial liquidity.131 This granted the United States a
considerable degree of control over these nations’ foreign policy, as the Americans could threaten
to withdraw financial support should Britain or France cross them on the international stage.
Indeed, during the Suez Crisis the United States threatened to cut off the supply of
Venezuelan oil, on which Britain especially had come to depend, increasing the pressure on the
two powers.132 These power plays signified the influence America maintained in the new
international economic order, and demonstrated not only that they would flex their economic
muscle to achieve geopolitical goals, but that they would do so at the expense of their staunchest
allies, and their imperialist aims, if necessary.133 These actions exemplified a rare period of tension
between the Western bloc during the Cold War, 134 illustrating that neither the United Kingdom
nor France could use force to further their foreign policy objectives, a radical departure from the
decidedly imperialistic state of the world mere decades earlier.
More than proving only that European imperialism was dead, Suez illustrates the pivotal
changes in the international system following World War II, providing a microcosm of the growing
power of decolonial nationalism, the non-aligned movement, and the pragmaticism of American
foreign policy. America feared that developing nations, recently free from the shackles of imperial
rule, would choose to align themselves with the Soviet Union or China, viewing the United States
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as an imperialist power in the same vein as the old powers of Europe.135 Such a potentiality “put
decolonization in a new context: the emergence of nationalism, from Washington’s perspective,
could cause as much trouble as the persistence of colonialism.”136 Colonialism and decolonial
nationalism formed a vicious cycle from the American perspective, wherein the continued
existence of the former only exacerbated potentially anti-American sentiments in the latter.
Anti-American sentiments could have potentially led “third-world” nations into the waiting
arms of the Soviet Union; “I’m not an adventurer,” Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev once
exclaimed, “but we must aid national liberation movements.”137 Yet some nations in this emerging
third world were wary of either superpower’s hegemonic ambitions, opting to walk a different
path. The first conference of these so-called “non-aligned” powers convened in Bandung,
Indonesia, in April 1955, discussing and advocating neutrality as a means to preserve national
sovereignty; non-aligned powers, their leaders hoped, could balance the competing interests of the
two superpowers, courting favor with both in a precarious balance that at its core advanced
domestic national interests. Nasser, as it were, “would soon prove to be the most skillful of all the
practitioners of ‘non-alignment.’”138
In standing up to perceived Anglo-French imperial aggression, Nasser showed the rest of
the Arab world, and the entire third world, that the days of European supremacy had long passed,
and that nations once at the mercy of those powers now possessed and could assert power of their
own. He exhibited tact and cunning in maneuvering within the United States and the Soviet
Union’s bipolar international system, operating within the marginal spaces between the two and
exploiting each other’s geopolitical fears to his advantage. Personally, the Crisis enabled the rise
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of Nasser as an influential international actor. To paraphrase a scene in Christopher Nolan’s
Batman Begins, the Egyptian President became more than a man; he became a symbol. That
symbol signified the emergence of global, decolonial nationalism, the trust of a nation placed in a
single individual, and the ability of that individual to navigate the winds of history towards their
ultimate objectives. Indeed, Nasser did not accomplish such a herculean task as cementing the
decline of the British Empire entirely through grand strategic ingenuity; his primary adversary,
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, took several painful missteps that made Nasser’s path far
less treacherous.

The Aging British Lion
Anthony Eden held office during the Suez Crisis, an event that, as characterized by
historian David Carlton, “cruelly punctured most of the [United Kingdom’s] remaining pretensions
to being a power of the first rank.”139 The conflict, in other words, cemented the end of Britain’s
status as a global power in her national consciousness. Yet, if Suez was truly Britain’s Hellespont,
the roots of the calamity ran deep. Throughout the Crisis and through the lens of Anthony Eden
himself, one observes numerous echoes of earlier mentalities, patterns, and events that shaped
Britain’s contemporary perception of their imperial status. This obsession and widespread
misconstruing of the lessons of the past heavily contributed to Britain’s grand strategic failure
during the Suez Crisis. British national identity at this time was still informed by the legacy of
World War II and their global empire; it was the pursuit to maintain the latter drove them to their
drastic actions at Suez. Moreover, the British, unlike Nasser, failed to observe the macroscopic
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structural changes in the global system, namely the ever-rising tide of decolonial sentiment and
frustration with the empires of olde. The nation’s oblivious foreign policy directives enabled
Nasser to manipulate the crisis to his advantage.
Eden’s mentality throughout the crisis proved decidedly stuck in a previous conflict;
specifically, his erroneous characterization of Nasser as a fascist despot, reminiscent of Hitler or
Mussolini, was a driving factor in Eden’s insistence of the use of force against Egypt. Appeasement
in any form appeared to Eden ineffectual and even dangerous, or so the terrible lessons of the
nineteen-thirties and World War II ingrained in him.140 In a personal telegram to President
Eisenhower dated August 5th, 1956, Eden espouses that “Nasser has embarked on a course which
is unpleasantly familiar. His seizure of the Canal was undoubtedly designed to impress opinion
not only in Egypt but in the Arab World and in all Africa too.”141 There is little doubt that Eden
viewed Nasser’s nationalization of the Canal as akin to the German annexation of Austria, the
Sudetenland, or Czechoslovakia: the three actions that proved merely the prelude to a disastrous,
general European war. Later in the same message, Eden explicitly teases out Nasser’s supposed
connection to his fascist “peers,” writing “I have never thought Nasser a Hitler… But the parallel
with Mussolini is close. Neither of us can forget the lives and treasure he cost us before he was
finally dealt with.”142 The living memory of World War II and the miscalculated passivity of
British strategy prior to that conflict left a discernable mark on Eden and wider British policy
during the Suez Crisis.
In line with concerns of appeasing a supposed dictator, Eden’s government also acted in
the interests of preserving the remnants of their once globe-spanning empire. This philosophy
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forced them into a situation in which their grand imperial ambition outstripped their now
comparatively humble economic, militaristic, and geopolitical capabilities. For despite granting
independence to the Indian subcontinent in 1947, thereby freeing up a vast amount of resources to
be allocated in pursuit of colonial objectives elsewhere, the nation remained “a front-rank global
power if judged by its commitments. But it was certainly not so if judged by its capacity to fulfil
them.”143 The disastrous economic reality of Great Britain in 1945 contributed to this, fostering an
increasingly unilateral dependence on American financing and trade; the United Kingdom owed
£15 billion to the United States in 1945.144 It could therefore ill afford to give up its other colonial
possessions, despite the significant cost to project the necessary power to such spatially disparate
areas. Indeed, in 1947 chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, estimated that the British
government spent £1 billion each year to deploy over 1.5 million British colonial administrators,
including soldiers, across the colonies.145 The British government placed much hope in Egypt
specifically, believing the area ripe for economic development and more easily governable than
their colonies in Asia and elsewhere in Africa.146 Taking those factors into account, the domestic
British economy could not support their still sizeable colonial apparatus, but neither could it
support their financial commitments to the United States—commitments essential to preventing
economic collapse—without revenue from the colonies: a Catch-22. Thus the British Empire
during the mid-twentieth century failed to abide by one of Gaddis’ most prescient lessons in grand
strategy: keeping ends within means.
Perhaps the disconnect between idealism and reality stemmed from erroneous assumptions
on the part of Eden and the British government regarding the state of decolonial movements. In
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1951, less than a year before the Free Officer Revolution and deposition of King Farouk, British
intelligence in Cairo relayed countless messages to their superiors in London exclaiming the
apparent elitism of Arab nationalism. Ralph Stevenson, then-British ambassador to Egypt,
believed that,
In claiming to represent the feelings of 20 million Egyptians when they accuse Britain of
refusing to grant Egypt her rights, ministers and newspaper editors are indulging in
demagogic exaggeration. They represent, in fact, the feelings of a minority of professional
politicians, would-be politicians and journalists… The majority of people, both in town
and country, are quite evidently pre-occupied with other matters.147
The mass appeal of Egyptian nationalism seemed incomprehensible to contemporary British
observers. Such a failure of intelligence speaks to, among other factors, the lack of British unity
on the issue of Nasser and Arab nationalism, and display the total naivety in dealing with Middle
Eastern geopolitics.
The French too displayed the same lack of awareness during the Suez Crisis proper. In an
August 2nd meeting between the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, the French
foreign minister, Christian Pineau, discussed a linguistic amendment to a communique to be sent
to Nasser, offering a potential solution. According to the minutes, Pineau “in referring to the
interests of Egypt wished there to be a specific mention of the Egyptian people.”148 To this US
Secretary of State John Dulles “considered that it was difficult to make a distinction between a
nation and its people.”149 While not explicit, the French Minister appears to characterize the
Egyptian people’s interest as distinctly different from the Egyptian nation’s. Perhaps Pineau began
to subscribe to the notion of inseparability that came to exist between Nasser and Egypt. By
distinguishing between the nation and the people, Pineau implicitly assented to British
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characterizations of the Egyptian government (and Nasser) as operating without the will of the
people backing them. Dulles correctly points out, as the United States often did throughout the
crisis, that the Egyptian people were not mere pawns to some individual or group of individuals,
but indeed supported the nationalization of the Suez Canal.
In mid-1956, before tripartite military operations commenced, MI6 proposed staging a
coup in Syria to topple the pro-Nasser government in the country, a plan that would have ostensibly
swayed regional opinion back against the Egyptian president and his campaign in Suez. However,
MI6’s proposed timing illustrated their lack of awareness, and perhaps literal communication, with
other British agencies. Indeed, at the same time the Foreign Office was in the midst of convincing
Israel to stage an attack on Suez for the British and French to “break up.” The Israeli invasion
would no doubt be seen as connected to the British plot and arouse suspicion in Syria. Indeed,
exactly that scenario played out once Syrian authorities received news of the Israeli offensive,
leading to the arrest of many potential usurpers before the plot could coalesce (it was planned to
occur on October 29th).150
There exists a continuity in British policy from the early 1950s through Suez: poor
intelligence and poor native cultural understanding. Had Britain grasped the volatility of Arab
nationalist sentiment in Egypt almost immediately prior to Nasser’s revolution, their forces may
have been able to respond and perhaps even prevent it. Moreover, their foreign-facing agencies
failed in understanding the regional dynamics of public opinion and the potential fallout of their
incredulously ill-coordinated, negatively compounding endeavors during the Suez Crisis proper.
Additionally, the British had buried themselves in too deep a hole. Henry Spruyt (of Ending
Empire) describes a paradox in which many empires find themselves as they expand: the inverse
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relationship between the ability to administer colonies and local populations’ opinion of their
colonial administrators. Spruyt writes that, “The greater the center’s desire to control and develop
its subject peripheries the more it unites the periphery against it.”151 In other words, the greater the
investment in colonial holdings, the greater the chance that the investment would result in a hostile
native population. And throughout the post-war era, Britain continued to invest vast amounts of
resources into her colonies. During the peak of the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, the United
Kingdom invested approximately 10 percent of the value of its exports on defense abroad.152 The
uptick to international economic historians P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, reflected “continuing
gentlemanly fantasies about great-power status.”153 This sentiment, echoing Napoleon’s invasion
of Russia, represented the abandonment of concrete objectives for abstract goals—ends
outstripping means. For all of Eden and Britain’s grand strategic failures in assessing Nasser and
Egypt’s anti-imperialist movements, and for all the ill-conceived economic and ideological
rationale clouding their vision, perhaps the greatest challenge to British preeminence in the Middle
East throughout the Suez Crisis, apart from Nasser himself, came from one of Britain’s staunchest
allies, the United States, working in concert with its greatest adversary, the Soviet Union.

Winston Churchill delivered a speech to the House of Commons on June 4th, 1940,
regarding the state of the British military’s evacuation from Dunkirk. In it he vowed never to
surrender, and if “this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire
beyond the oceans, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, will carry on the struggle until in God’s
good time the New World with all its power and might sets forth to the rescue and liberation of
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the Old.”154 Churchill sensed that the sources of power were moving away from Europe, Westward
towards America, Eastward towards Asia, and Southward towards Africa. While he still believed
this power would serve the whims of great European empires, time would bear out that Europe
would no longer be so disproportionately the focus of global power politics.
In seeking to explain the relative brevity of European imperial rule compared to other
empires throughout history, Elie Kedourie believes it to be the result of “two world wars which
were started and conducted by the European Great Powers and which left them in a position of
inferiority, not indeed to their colonies, but to the USA and the USSR—two Powers that, albeit for
different reasons, have equally adopted the slogan of “anticolonialism.”155 The Cold War, a
conflict stemming from the ideological battle between American free market capitalism and
Russian state-controlled communism, accelerated the end of European empires and forged an
international system in which the United States and the Soviet Union, in exceedingly rare instances
of agreement, held unilateral power over other states. The Suez Crisis exemplified the features of
the new global system, to the dismay of the British.

The Cold War via Suez
The Cold War began almost immediately after the conclusion of World War II in 1945. As
Berlin lay in rubble and Tokyo in smolders, the victorious powers, a grand alliance of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, set out to rebuild the world under a new global
order. As the only nation that emerged from the conflict more powerful than before, the United
States maintained an enviable position in the post-war world; America possessed a flourishing
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economy, control of the oceans via its impressive navy and wide-reaching network of foreign
military bases, and a (temporary) monopoly on the atomic bomb, the hitherto most powerful
weapon wrought by human hands.156 America’s position as global hegemon seemed all but
assured. However, the Soviet Union challenged this assumption. While the Russian economy lay
in tatters in 1945, by 1950 Soviet industrial production had surpassed prewar levels by an
astounding 71 percent.157 Russia was the world’s second largest economy by GDP in 1960.158 The
two nations respectively comprised the leaders of the twentieth century’s great ideological
movements: capitalism and communism. America sought to spread neoliberal, free-market
capitalism across the globe to expand its economic influence and open new markets for trade,
while Russia believed that nominally egalitarian communism, primarily based on state-controlled
planned economies, offered better prospects for the future.
Beyond ideology, the two nations became increasingly afraid of a potential war between
one another, leading to a decades-long arms race akin to the Anglo-German naval arms race of the
early 1910s (trading dreadnoughts out for thermonuclear weapons). In short, both the United States
and the Soviet Union pursued the proliferation of their respective worldviews as a means to ensure
their national security and international geopolitical position, all the while wary of engaging one
another in direct conflict over these aspirations.
The Suez Crisis lies within this deeper context of the Cold War, an example of the
international bipolar power structure’s pervasiveness and intrusion into nearly every pivotal event
of the era. Indeed, the United States and the Soviet Union’s world system hampered Britain’s
ability to enforce their agenda at Suez, facilitating and enabling Nasser’s victory without his direct
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involvement. American involvement prior to and during the Crisis proved an increasingly irksome
thorn in the British government’s side, considering their dated delusions of imperial grandeur. The
Soviet intervention, along with consensus international opinion, while less influential than
America’s, delivered the knockout punch, shattering the at one point tangible illusions of a
coalition victory. And while it may seem that the Cold War dimension of the Suez Crisis
minimized the impact Nasser’s leadership throughout, this is far from the case.

American Involvement in the Middle East Prior to Suez
The United States and United Kingdom initially appeared to share common goals for the
post-war Middle East’s structure. In the late 1940s both envisioned a “Middle East Command” to
defend against communist influence, led by a British Supreme Commander and staffed by officers
from the United States, France, Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand—
incredulously, only two of the nine could call themselves “Middle Eastern.”159 Yet the origins of
future discontent already existed; the United States adopted an unflinchingly anti-colonial stance,
to better position themselves as an alternative to the more overtly anti-imperial communists.160
And over time the Americans began to suspect that the MEC may simply be a cover for the British
to advance their own imperial and economic interests in the region, rather than a bulwark against
the international spread of communism and Soviet influence.161 Indeed, in 1953 US policy in the
Middle East remained committed to their worldwide doctrine of containment, even when that put
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them at odds with British interests. While the British believed maintaining a base at Suez the most
strategically sound step towards maintaining their regional power, the Americans cared relatively
little for it.162
By 1955 the MEC had manifested itself in the Baghdad Pact, a defense agreement between
Arab nations and the United Kingdom that sought to solidify the regional order under British
dominion. While ostensibly a pact among equals—Jordan and Iraq were the primary potential
signatories, while Nasser’s Egypt had bluntly rejected membership— the United States was, by
mid-1955, entirely convinced that it represented nothing more than a cleverly disguised imperial
takeover of the Middle East by Britain. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Dulles
concurred that “the British had taken [the Baghdad Pact] over and run it as an instrument of British
policy – that has drawn down upon it a tremendous amount of criticism.”163 It is evident, then, that
the Americans had the British on a short leash. The British still relied on American financing to
prop up their economy and continued fantasies of great power status, which made them particularly
reliant on American support in the Middle East or, more specifically, America not withdrawing
their support for British policy. Unfortunately for Eden and the British government, the Suez Crisis
would force America’s hand, testing the degree to which the Anglo-American alliance could bend
before ultimately breaking under the immense pressure of the Cold War international system.

American Involvement in the Middle East During Suez
While the United States never directly involved itself in military action against either side
during the Suez Crisis, it brought its immense geopolitical influence to bear in the negotiation and
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ultimate resolution to the conflict, to the detriment of the British. Indeed, the withdrawal of
American support spelled disaster for the advancement of British aims, as the United States’ assent
to British policy in the Middle East had hitherto been a key assumption in the formation of British
policy; the UK could act more aggressively if they knew America stood behind them.
Over the course of the crisis, the three principal Western powers, the US, UK, and France,
held numerous so-called “tripartite talks,” often headed by French Foreign Minister Christian
Pineau, British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, and American Secretary of State John Dulles. The
meetings generally discussed how the three powers were to navigate the crisis. Observing records
of these meetings, one notices the same behaviors that characterized earlier interactions between
British and American diplomats concerning Middle East policy. Moreover, the meetings during
Suez showcase the heightened tensions that would eventually result in America turning against the
British.
In August, only weeks after Nasser nationalized the Canal, most of the talks revolved
around negotiation, communication with Nasser, and organizing a conference between nations
with a vested interest in the operation of the Canal. The seventh meeting of the tripartite delegation,
dated August 2, 1956, discussed in detail a proposed conference between the various belligerent
powers, whose economies relied significantly on the smooth operation of the canal.164 In this
meeting, Pineau and Lloyd pushed Dulles on several issues that, while not expressly aggressive,
certainly rang of imperialist undertones (that the Americans would not support). For example,
when Dulles thought that “the conference should not be held in the capitals of any of the Powers
principally concerned,” preferring Geneva or Rome, “Both the Foreign Secretary [Lloyd] and M.
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Pineau expressed their preference for London.”165 Dulles’ proposal would have extended an olive
branch to Nasser, as such a venue would espouse an inherent neutrality and express that the French
and British sought genuine negotiations as a means to resolve the Crisis. Lloyd and Pineau’s choice
of host city, on the other hand, would have instantly alienated the Egyptian President and made
negotiations more standoffish. Indeed, Nasser rejected the invitation once London was ultimately
chosen as the host city for the conference because he suspected bad-faith mediation.166
In the same meeting, Lloyd expressed incredulity at Dulles’ suggestion of including the
Soviet Union in the conference, with the minutes stating that he “had the greatest difficulty in
accepting the United States suggestion that the Soviet Union should be invited to the conference.
He considered that this would be most dangerous”167 Counterintuitively, it was the British who
exhibited trepidation at the prospects of inviting a power friendly to Nasser’s cause. As the
conference would inevitably come to some consensus and set a course of action, it behooved the
British and French to have as few states aligned with Egypt as possible. They also accomplished
this by attempting to pack the conference with their own allies; when Dulles suggested Saudi
Arabia and Iran ought to be invited, the other two men retorted that “Iraq would also have to be
invited.”168 As a British-backed monarchy, Iraq would be yet another friendly face at the
conference. While this level of political bickering at first appears innocuous, it proved only a taste
of events to come.
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Indeed, the initial crack in Anglo-American relations soon developed into an increasingly
wide rift. In an October 8 telegram from the United Kingdom’s UN delegation, addressed to Eden,
diplomat Pierson Dixon elaborates rumors of a split in American and British relations. He writes,
I saw Dulles alone before our meeting last night. I said that I was increasingly worried at
the talk of a rift in the Security Council between the United States and the United Kingdom.
For example, after our meeting on Friday morning, at which there had been agreement on
tactics in the Security Council, the papers had been full of our alleged differences. I had
been told that much of this came from the United States delegation and that Dulles himself
had told his inner circle of Press men privately that the British would have to accept the
Indian proposals of last August.169
Dixon here appears fraught at the potential of discontinuity in the Anglo-American camp. While
Dulles later assured Dixon that these rumors were unfounded,170 the United States’ later actions
appeared to confirm Dixon’s doubts.
Less than a month later, after British and French paratroopers had established a foothold at
Port Said, to great international condemnation, their need for their American ally was at its greatest.
Instead, Eden’s government were met by a stubbornly uncooperative Eisenhower. For the British
operated under the assumption of unflinching American support. Instead, in early November 1956,
they received economic sanctions. The previously discussed British reliance on American
financing had finally come to a head, as the value of the pound sterling had plummeted with the
increasing probability, then eventual reality, of British military action in Egypt. As a direct result
of the campaign, the United States blocked British access to international loans via the IMF,
severely inhibiting Britain’s ability to prosecute the military campaign and threatening to tank their
entire economy.171 So the ally on which Britain depended for support in the conflict, who once
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rectify the situation. Kyle. Suez, 157.
170
Ibid.
171
Kyle. Suez, 464-65.
169

72

The Chosen One?

Hobbs

enabled the development of a unified Western geopolitical front in the Middle East, had turned its
back on Britannia when she most needed help. Yet anti-imperial leanings alone did not dictate the
American position during Suez; the Soviet Union and wider international opinion too remained
stacked against the Anglo-French coalition, to Nasser’s delight.

The Soviet and International Response to the Suez Crisis
The Soviet Union, while not as directly involved as the Americans in discussions with the
British, nonetheless made their opinions known throughout the Crisis. In minutes during a UN
security council meeting on October 8, 1956, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmitri
Shepilov, expressed his support for the Egyptian cause, stating that:
The Western Powers had put forward several different plans for a settlement but these
differed only in form, while retaining the same substance, i.e. an approach to Egypt on an
unequal basis. The real meaning of the plan presented to Egypt by the Menzies Mission
was to deprive Egypt indefinitely of the right to operate the canal.172
Shepilov denounced the British, French, and presumably American attempt at negotiation,
furthering an anti-imperial, implicitly pro-Soviet message when he argued that the tripartite powers
did not view Egypt as an equal. These sentiments belie the general predilection of Russia to support
Nasser’s regime, particularly after Nasser decided to purchase weapons from Czechoslovakia, a
member of the Eastern bloc (an act that precipitated Western withdrawal from the Aswan Dam
project, and indirectly, the entire Suez Crisis).173 Indeed, the Soviets used the Crisis as an
opportunity to flex their geopolitical muscle, making sweeping, inflammatory statements about the
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West perpetuating colonialism in nations that had firmly rejected it.174 Khrushchev, for his part,
publicly threatened Britain and France with utter nuclear annihilation.175
Other nations also supported Nasser’s cause, albeit with less terrifying threats. The Indian
government, for example, stood firmly on Nasser’s side. When the Australian Prime Minister,
Robert Menzies, approached Nasser with a proposed convention to resolve the Crisis—to be held
in London and whose agenda to be set by British interests—Nasser baulked at the offer, instead
proposing a conference between powers who possessed vested interests in the operation of the
Canal.176 The Indian government, led at the time by noted decolonial Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru,

supported Nasser’s counter-proposal both privately and inadvertently in a public

statement. The British Embassy in Cairo relayed a cable back to London on September 14th,
believing that, “Nasser’s proposal for negotiation made directly with the Menzies Mission… was
worked out previously with the Indians, [and] received some support from the statement made a
few days ago by an Indian spokesman here that Nasser’s proposal had been made with the Indians’
full support.”177 India, once the crown jewel of the British Empire, had, during the Suez debacle,
turned their back on the British cause. Instead, they threw in their lot with the rising, decolonial
power in Nasser’s Egypt.
This inflection point illustrated at once the waning power and prestige of the British Empire
along with the emerging power of Egypt as an influential regional, even global, actor. Some of
Egypt’s Arab neighbors, too, offered their support. Libya, for example, refused to assist British
preparations for war in any capacity, despite the divisions of British armored vehicles stationed
there; the British ambassador exclaimed that should Libyans see British military materiel in
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operation, “it would be certain to precipitate a wave of violence.”178 The wider world, apart from
a handful of dependent allies, began to turn against Britain and France. Tito’s Yugoslavia
supported Nasser’s right to nationalize the Canal.179 Press in the Netherlands, slow to side against
the British or French, made clear their condemnation of the use of force to achieve a resolution.180
This was due to in no small part the relative soundness of Egyptian legal argument, espousing
Nasser’s sovereign right to nationalize the Suez Canal.

Livre Blanc: The Egyptian White Paper
Nasser’s initial decision to nationalize the Suez Canal appealed to both his anti-imperialist
and economically socialist leanings. Moreso than the ability to defend the Canal’s nationalization
with force, Nasser recognized the need to defend his proclamation legally. To that end, his Ministry
for Foreign Affairs published the White Paper on the Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal
Company on August 12, 1956. The document provided a copy of the Egyptian government’s
decree nationalizing the Canal, copies of the various concessions and conventions governing the
canal’s operation, and legal justifications for the course of action (that directly cited previously
mentioned operational precedents). While military power had often proved an unsurmountable
obstacle in imperialist relations in the prior century, Nasser successfully defended his bold,
calculated risk of nationalization through plain logic and (mostly) sound legal understanding.181
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The White Paper, often referred to as Livre Blanc contemporaneously, presents a
compelling, yet oddly forgotten case study as the documentary embodiment of Nasser’s
revolutionary, pan-Arabist, anti-imperialist ideals. Built on the precedent of four main pieces of
legislation—Egypt’s 1956 Constitution, the Suez Canal Concessions of 1854 and 1866, and the
Suez Convention of 1888—Law No. 285 tersely elaborated the Egyptian act of nationalization.
While the decree itself is quite short, at only four pages, Livre Blanc runs at seventy-two. The other
sixty-eight pages contain fascinating, if occasionally jargon-filled, legal documents, explanatory
notes, and ideological statements justifying and defending nationalization.
The document itself remains understudied by the wider historical community and its
significance underappreciated. Its publication, while not solely responsible for Nasser’s
geopolitical triumph, illustrated the overwhelming success of the Egyptians in propositioning and
convincing international causes of the merits of their case. The White Paper additionally illustrates
examples of the wider procession of Egyptian society, redolent of Nasserist nationalist sentiment.
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Pictured Above: The cover of the White Paper on the Nationalisation of the Suez Maritime
Canal Company. Photo by Author.

77

The Chosen One?

Hobbs

The Legality of Nationalization
Nasser’s path towards forever cementing himself in history via the Suez Crisis began in
earnest in January 1956, when he proposed a new Egyptian state constitution. This document
contained provisions that later enabled Nasser to assume total executive power during the Crisis,
while also providing much of the historical context that precipitated nationalization. The executive,
according to the 1956 constitution:
has the right to propose, veto, and promulgate laws. The Assembly may overrule
his veto by a two-thirds vote. In collaboration with his ministers, the President lays down
general policy and supervises its execution. Between sessions of the Assembly he may
issue recess decrees which have the force of law but require the confirmation of the
Assembly within 15 days of its reconvening. The Assembly may in special circumstances
delegate the law-making power to the President.
The President is the supreme commander of the armed forces. He appoints and
dismisses civil, diplomatic, and military officials, has the right to issue pardons and
commute sentences, declares war with the consent of the National Assembly, concludes
treaties which become law after approval of the Assembly, declares a state of emergency
subject to the approval of the Assembly within 15 days or at its next sitting, and has the
right, after consulting the Assembly, to take major issues to the people by referendum.182
These provisions paved the way for an exceptionally powerful executive body, which many
(rightly) presumed Nasser would head.183 Specifically, the lines permitting the President to “[lay]
down general policy and [supervise] its execution” offer an immense grey area where one may act
outside the bounds of the standard legislative procedures established earlier in the constitution.
Additionally, that the assembly may “delegate law-making power to the President,” in the context

“The New Egyptian Constitution.” Middle East Journal 10, no. 3 (1956): 300–306.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4322826, 303.
183
Osgood Caruthers. "NASSER DISCLOSES NEW CONSTITUTION: BASIC LAW, TO BE APPROVED
BY EGYPTIANS, WOULD END 3-YEAR JUNTA RULE ONE-PARTY ASSEMBLY SET PRESIDENT TO
HEAD STATE." New York Times (1923-), Jan 17, 1956.
https://colby.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/nasserdiscloses-new-constitution/docview/113597802/se-2?accountid=10198.
182

78

The Chosen One?

Hobbs

of a charisma-driven regime such as Nasser’s, even prior to Suez, facilitated Nasser’s proclivity to
taking matters into his own hands.
Indeed, Law No. 285, declaring nationalization, presented an example of this unilateral
law-making. The text of Livre Blanc read:
SUEZ CANAL COMPANY
NATIONALISATION LAW
-----DECREE LAW NO. 285 OF 1956
Respecting the Nationalisation of the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company.184
-----The text recognizes the law as a “decree law,” implying Nasser’s personal passage and stamp of
approval. This action was in accordance with the 1956 Constitution, specifically the lines
permitting the President to “issue recess decrees which have the force of law.”185 Thus, the clauses
within the 1956 constitution bestowed Nasser, the “heir”-apparent to the Egyptian Presidency, the
proper legislative mechanisms with which he could enact a law nationalizing the Suez Canal
Company.
The constitution referenced the so-called “six-point program of the RCC,”186 principles
that closely aligned with the philosophy of Law no. 285. Laid out in the preamble to the
constitution, the “six points”—in quotations because the following quote mentions seven—
advocated for “the abolition of imperialism, "feudalism", monopoly, and the control of capitalist
influence over the system of government, and the establishment of a strong army, social justice,
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and a democratic society.”187 The Egyptian government could have written the three of the first
four points in regards to the foreign operation of the Suez Canal directly, as imperialism,
monopoly, and “capitalist influence” characterize the contemporary Egyptian conception of the
Canal.
Indeed, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi, delivered a speech to that effect
to the United Nations Security Council on October 8, 1956. In the speech he defended the Egyptian
act of nationalization, pointing towards the disastrous decades of British imperialism, total control,
and economic exploitation as the actions Egypt attempted to stifle. A British observer recounted
that:
Mr. Fawzi spoke of the historical significance of the Suez Canal questions which was in
essence the struggle between domination and freedom… During the nineteenth century
Britain’s attitude to the Canal had [changed] from fierce opposition to violent love. Egypt
had sacrificed her sons and given security, money, and above all her pledge to keep the
Canal always free for international navigation- a pledge which had been scrupulously
honoured. The Company by contrast after squandering a good deal of the revenue gulped
practically all the rest, leaving Egypt only a trickle. Now France and the United Kingdom
together with a segment of the former Company, were trying to ensure that the Canal should
be finally amputated from Egypt.188
Examples of the three aforementioned patterns exist in Fawzi’s remarks. “Domination and
freedom” describe the period of British control—never truly ending until June 1956 when the last
British troops evacuated Suez.
Nasser used the White Paper to exactly articulate the Egyptian position on nationalization,
exploiting the complicated interactions of different articles of several concessions and conventions
to build a well-argued case in favor of his decree’s legality on the international stage. In addition
to the Egyptian constitution, Nasser drew upon 19th-century documents governing the operation
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and legal status of the Canal. Article 10 of the original 1854 Firman of Concession—signed by the
Viceroy of Egypt Mohamed Said and the Canal’s visionary, Frenchman Ferdinand De Lesseps—
stipulates that:
Art. 10. – At the expiration of the concession the Egyptian Government will take
the place of the Company, and enjoy all its rights without reservation, the said Government
will enter into full possession of the Canal of the two Seas, and of all the establishments
connected therewith. The indemnity to be allowed the Company for the relinquishment of
its plant and movables shall be arranged by amicable agreement or arbitration.189
Upon the termination of the 99-year lease, laid out in article 3 of the same Firman,190 the Egyptian
Government would have for all intents and purposes nationalized the Canal, being solely
responsible for its operation and maintenance. The lease term, beginning the day the Suez Canal
opened, would have expired in 1968, only twelve years after Nasser’s declaration. So while Article
10 of the 1854 Firman established the right of the Egyptian Government to take ownership of the
Canal, it did not grant Nasser the express right to nationalize it when he saw fit.
The legal right to do so, to Nasser and his party, lay in Article 16 of the Agreement of
February 22, 1866, establishing the final terms of the Suez concession. Under a bolded header in
the White Paper that states “The Company is Subject to Egyptian Sovereignty and to Laws
and Customs of the Country”191 the original text of the concession reads:
Art. 16. – Since the Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal is an Egyptian
Company, it remains subject to the laws and usages of the country. However, regarding its
constitution as a Company and the relation of shareholders among themselves, it is—in
virtue of a special convention—governed by the laws regulating joint stock companies. It
White Paper, 19. Also found in: Barbara Harlow & Mia Carter, Archives of Empire Volume 1. (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2003), 624. Contrary to the author’s initial thought that the Egyptian government
may have published only certain sections of the concession documents that favored their views, Nasser
instead published them in their entirety. The Archives of Empire sourcebook, moreover, cited the original
Egyptian White Paper as the source for their publication of the concession documents. Both citations have
been provided above to highlight this peculiarity, but moving forward the archives of empire citation will
be used except where necessary.
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has been agreed that all disputes resulting thereof will be submitted to arbiters in France
for judgement and with appeals before the Imperial Court of Paris as being a superarbiter…
As regards the disputes that may arise between the Company and the Egyptian
Government, these must in like manner be referred to Egyptian judiciary and settled in
accordance with Egyptian law.192
This article contains contradictory language on the subject of the Company’s adherence to
Egyptian law. While it acknowledges explicitly that the Company “remains subject to the laws and
usages of the country,” it then states that disputes regarding the Company’s “constitution as a
Company and the relation of shareholders among themselves” is subject to French jurisdiction.
This is confusing, as the Egyptian White Paper attempts to paint this article as firm evidence in
favor of nationalization, as evidenced by the bolded header that precedes the passage. To be
certain, Nasser’s party likely saw the latter portion of the passage (“disputes that may arise… in
accordance with Egyptian law.”) as a sort of carte blanche in favor of Egyptian legal supremacy
over the Company, although the exact phrasing proves nebulous.
In a later passage, under the header “ENGLAND RECOGNIZES THE EGYPTIAN
NATIONALITY OF THE CANAL COMPANY BEFORE MIXED COURTS IN EGYPT,”
the White Paper references a 1940 legal case in which the British Government asserted the
following principles in defense of their position: “The Suez Canal Company is a legal person in
accordance with Egyptian law. Its nationality and character are solely Egyptian. It is therefore
subject to Egyptian laws.”193 In contrast to Article 16 of the 1866 agreement, the British here
seemingly cede any right to regulate the Company under British or any other nation’s law.
However, it is difficult to discern which portions of this particular section of the White Paper are
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precisely quoting the 1940 British legal case, and which portions are the Egyptian government’s
own views; there is an inconsistent and potentially erroneous employment of quotation marks.194
Halford Hoskins, a professor of law at Tufts University, assessed this 1940 legal case in
multiple articles published in Geographical Review and The American Journal of International
Law in 1940 and 1943, respectively. Hoskins writes in the former article that, “Being of worldwide importance, [the Suez Canal] cannot be submitted to a nationalistic solution if it is to be
solved in the general interest in accordance with the basic concepts of our present type of
civilization.”195 While not imposing a strictly legal interpretation in this instance, Hoskins
nonetheless espouses a version of the vague “internationalist” argument Britain selectively
employed during the Suez Crisis.
In the latter article, Hoskins provides a more legally grounded opinion, believing that the
British minimized Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal, arguing that public declarations
expressing the British retention of control over the Canal as
based on the assumption that, since the special position occupied by Great Britain relative
to the Canal since 1888 (then lately re-acknowledged by the Powers in being embodied in
the post-war treaty settlement) had existed prior to the protectorate, it would be unaffected
by the establishment of Egyptian independence.196
The British declarations do not apply to a particular version of Egypt’s government, only Egypt as
a whole. As such, the fact that Farouk and the monarchy still held power would not bolster Nasser’s
argument. Still, the British seemed to rely on the projection of soft power and status quo
administration as their basis for operating the Canal, rather than specific legal arguments.
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This lack of tangible standing ensured that the British legal argument faltered, also due to
the imprecision of the concession and convention’s language—the fact that the British argued
against their case in Suez a mere sixteen years prior is simply the final nail in the coffin. For while
there may have been (weak) merits to the British (and French) arguments, there existed no
definitive act that precluded Egypt from nationalizing the Canal. So long as the nationalization of
a company was legal, as Nasser ensured when he drafted the new Egyptian constitution in January
1956,197 Law no. 285, nationalizing the Suez Canal was legal.
Nasser’s legal gambit relied on what amounted to circular reasoning; the canal was subject
to Egyptian laws, and Nasser unilaterally (but legally) passed a law nationalizing the Canal,
therefore Law no. 285 was legal under Egyptian law. In contrast to earlier cases of nationalization,
such as the Iranian nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (on which a brief
background was provided in footnote 131), where there existed specific provisions forbidding
unilateral nationalization, no such clauses exist in the documents governing the operations of the
Suez Canal; that Nasser could legally nationalize the Company spoke more to the shrewd
employment of loopholes than any internationally recognized legal “right.”
The British, however, largely ignored the Egyptian legal argument, instead focusing their
propaganda might on portraying Nasser as an evil fascist, akin to Hitler or Mussolini (as Eden
espoused in a previously referenced telegram).198 Such an oversight was intentional, but
unfortunate. While the British believed they could better sway public opinion through their
visceral, emotional propaganda, rather than admittedly dry legal jargon, challenging Nasser’s
legality in the public sphere would have at the very least offered a different narrative from a legal

White Paper, 60-61.
Tony Shaw. Eden, Suez, and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion During the Suez Crisis. (London: I.B.
Tauris, 1996), 190.
197
198

84

The Chosen One?

Hobbs

perspective. Indeed, the legal debate in the United Nations primarily heard voices from Egypt’s
camp. Meeting minutes dated October 8, 1956 read: “The morning was occupied by lengthy
Egyptian and Russian speeches.”199 While the Egyptian delegation appeared entirely comfortable
discussing their legal argument, the British instead appeared to shy away, content in their character
assassination of Nasser.
Livre Blanc’s significance extends beyond its mere utility as an expression of Egypt’s legal
defense of nationalization. Between its frequent appeals to Egyptian nationhood and sovereignty,
the document stands as a potent reminder of the strong assertion of Egyptian will against the
seemingly indominable British Empire. Law no. 285, contained in the White Paper does not, after
claim to be advancing the interests of elites, monarchs, aristocrats, or any other stratified sect of
society. Instead, it claims the Canal “in the name of the nation,” implying, if examined within
Greenfeld’s nationalist framework, its shared (primarily metaphorical) ownership by all
Egyptians.200 One Egyptian, however, bore more responsibility than most for the success of the
defiant act.

The Nimble Desert Fox
The Suez Crisis solidified in the eyes of nearly all Egyptians, and observers the world over,
the primacy of Nasser’s power in the nation and the region. Nasser’s personal decision-making, as
all major decisions during the crisis were his and his alone, “brought Nasser total domination.”201
Far from any semblance of checks, balances, or division of power, Nasser relished in this
absolutism, allowing him to act far more quickly and decisively than any legislative body. While
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some historians disagree on the degree to which Nasser held sway over the Free Officers
movement—the contingent of military officers responsible for ousting King Farouk in 1952—
before Suez, few if any doubt that the Crisis cemented his emergence as a national and regional
hero.202 Some scholars observed alternative routes the Egyptian Revolution may have taken,
including those without Nasser at the helm, but by 1956 the Colonel had successfully cut off those
options, in the eyes of P.J. Vatikiotis “highlight[ing] his ambition and perhaps vision, and
suppl[ying] the momentum for his personal rule for another decade.”203 The Suez debacle, then,
represented the ultimate ascension of Nasser to absolute power in Egypt; afterwards there would
be no Egypt without Nasser. The man’s actions throughout the event produced reverberations that
soon spread across the region as a whole. Just as Egypt would never be the same after Nasser, so
too did he profoundly and irreversibly alter the wider Arab world. The Crisis brought with it a
massive outpouring of public support from all corners of the Arab Middle East, from Syria to
Jordan to Saudi Arabia.204 So visceral was the Saudi Arabian reaction to Nasser’s September 1956
visit and public appearance with King Sa’ud that Mohamed Heikal remarked—albeit perhaps to
bolster Nasser’s public image even further—that the meeting was “embarrassing for Nasser,
because everyone knew that the [Saudi] people were there to cheer him, not their King.”205
Nasser received such praise because he constructed a narrative in which he bore sole
responsibility for the Suez Crisis (for better or worse). French Historian Jean Lacouture
summarizes the state of Nasser’s triumph as such:
All the major decisions had been made by him alone: the rejection of the Anglo-French
ultimatum of October 30, the secret appeal to President Eisenhower on November 1, and
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the commitment of the same date to withdraw from Sinai, which was followed by
acceptance of a cease-fire on November 6.206
To Egyptians the Canal represented much more than a mere economic asset; it represented the
plight of the Egyptian people, who had suffered under various forms of foreign domination for
centuries (if one includes Ottoman rule).207 Nasser, to them, was the man who ended that dark
period. Moreover, the fact that he did it acting primarily by himself, solely possessing the
instruments of power in the Egyptian government, further bolstered his image in the eyes of the
Egyptian nation.
The calculated risk paid off immensely. On November 6, the cease-fire went into effect,
and the Anglo-French began preparations to withdraw. For while thousands of Egyptian soldiers
had died in the relatively brief fighting, Nasser’s reputation was that of a hero. For he had, in the
apt summation of John Lewis Gaddis, “kept the canal, humiliated the colonialists, and balanced
Cold War superpowers against one another, while securing his position as the undisputed leader
of Arab nationalism.”208 In other words, Nasser accomplished everything at the cost of
comparatively little. His seizure of the Canal enabled rapid economic development, along with
facilitating the construction of the Aswan Dam (determining the sources of funding for which
contributed to Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Canal in the first place).209
Indeed, the Canal and the Dam represented the two primary public-sector successes under
Nasser’s ambitious, so-called “second revolution,” wherein the Egyptian economy would
transition into a competitive, albeit state-run, planned economy.210 It is ironic that one of Nasser’s
few economic successes proved to characterize the popular perception of his rule as a whole, and
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this was no doubt the result of careful manipulation of public opinion. Speaking to his people the
Friday after the cease-fire, Nasser “struck up a song of triumph: Egypt had vanquished her
enemies,” proclaiming that Egypt had finally rid itself of its violent imperialist oppressors.211
While Nasser claimed the victory for himself and his nation at the time, in hindsight he held a
different opinion. When asked in 1964 what event most contributed to the outcome of the Suez
Crisis, Nasser responded instead: “Eisenhower.”212
For all the immense, incomprehensible patterns and processes at work during the Suez
Crisis, it is telling that Nasser believed the most important factor to be the actions of a single
person. While the British contended with a legacy of anti-appeasement policy and imperialist
insecurity combined with ineffective propaganda; while America asserted itself over its older
brother as the preeminent Western superpower; and while the Soviet Union and the world at large
gave Egypt their support (in Russia’s case with nuclear assurances), the most pivotal actor in the
Suez Crisis insisted that a single man’s choice to threaten severe economic sanctions on the United
Kingdom influenced the conflict’s resolution to the greatest extent. A “great man” believed in the
power and historical agency of another “great man.”
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Epilogue
Reflections on Nasser’s Charismatic Legacy

Omar Khalifah’s Nasser in the Egyptian Imaginary explores the Egyptian President’s rule
through his portrayal and perception in popular media. “Nasser,” Khalifah writes, “was a largerthan-life character, a legend whose image, voice, ideals, accomplishments, deeds, misdeeds, and
defeats have been shaping Egyptian and Arabic life to date.”213 Published in 2018, Khalifah’s work
comprises one of the few studies of Nasser to emerge since the early 2000s.214 Despite this relative
dearth, Nasser the historical figure proves eminently influential up to the present. “Nasser,”
Khalifah goes on, “continues to be an essential component of the Egyptian imaginary.”215 Surely,
were the winds of history entirely responsible for the creation of history, one would not celebrate
figures such as Nasser; nor would the man possess such a potent and lasting gravitas of personality.

Omar Khalifah. Nasser in the Egyptian Imaginary. (Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press,
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And yet monumental figures, “great men” as Tolstoy would term them, exist throughout
humanity’s long history. From Xerxes to Napoleon, to Churchill, Eden, Eisenhower and Nasser,
these people have unquestionably altered the course of human events in significant ways. Yet all,
Nasser especially, have their circumstances to thank for placing them in the right place at the right
time (or, for Xerxes, Napoleon, and Eden, the wrong place and the wrong time). Consider the path
that led to Nasser’s ultimate triumph at Suez. It may easily have diverged at any moment, forever
changing the course of history. However, the path, while long and circuitous, placed Nasser in
exactly the right moment to create his spectacle. The history of Nasser’s Suez Crisis is in fact the
history of the confluence of nationalism, charismatic leadership, the British empire, American
hegemony, and the Cold War in Egypt in 1956.
Tolstoy himself might have condemned this sort of historicizing. In War and Peace he
wrote that:
If we assume as the historians do that great men lead humanity to the attainment of certain
ends--the greatness of Russia or of France, the balance of power in Europe, the diffusion
of the ideas of the Revolution, general progress, or anything else--then it is impossible to
explain the facts of history without introducing the conceptions of chance and genius.216
“Chance and genius,” to Tolstoy, then degraded the utility of historical theory. How could one
propose a theory, even, when “random” events often occur? This is Tolstoy’s crucial mistake.
Chance and genius do not entirely discredit the use of theory; in fact, their existence emphasizes
theory’s importance. How else might one sort through the practically infinite, oftentimes random,
catalog comprising the sequence of human events?
Historical theories can accomplish the impossible: creating order from chaos by
emphasizing certain pieces of knowledge over others. This act is never perfect. As the American
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historian Eric Foner put it: “the very selection and ordering of some ‘facts’ while ignoring others
is itself an act of interpretation.”217 Yet, without theory there would be only chronology, an art in
and of itself but ineffective in constructing a cohesive vision from humanity’s shared past.
“Chance and genius” could aptly describe Nasser’s success during the Suez Crisis if one
considered the events in a vacuum. Nasser could not have predicted the effectiveness of Livre
Blanc and the Egyptian legal argument among the international community, nor the poor reception
of the British propaganda campaign, nor could he have deduced that the United States would make
a temporary, localized alliance with their Soviet adversaries to push for an Anglo-French
withdrawal. That many, from Lacouture to Heikal, attribute the success overwhelmingly to
Nasser’s person grants the man too much credit. Credit is also due for the system in which he lived,
maneuvered, and manipulated.
From pan-Arab nationalism, a Nasserist movement with roots dating to medieval Europe,
to the Cold War and a global movement against imperialism; from British imperial and societal
decline after World War II to America claiming the leading role in the Western world; from
Nasser’s modern revolution with old roots to Britain’s new crisis with old leaders; from a Suez
Crisis enabled by the howling winds of history surrounding it, to the document that symbolizes
both the long and short causes, Livre Blanc. Nasser’s Egypt’s seminal work of legal, geopolitical,
and ideological argumentation tied together patterns and processes from 16th-century England
through 20th-century Europe into a tight, cohesive, seventy-two-page pamphlet. The document
simplified the immense preponderance of information available to solely what needed to be
included. In that sense, Livre Blanc was a work of historical and legal theory: one whose
significance and centrality in the history of the Suez Crisis still eludes historians. For while it may
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be only a single document, its ability to weave together the various disparate narrative threads of
the Crisis into a unified package grants it exceptional prescience. Livre Blanc then becomes a
symbol of wider historical forces, including some that a single document could not hope to alter.
That description fits Nasser as well: a man who played a significant, historically active role
in his time due to his skill, perception, and fortunate placement in the currents of history. Nasser’s
employment of Livre Blanc, and his general leadership throughout the Suez Crisis, serve as a
lesson for the ages that, despite the power of larger forces, people always have, and ultimately
always will, create history. Individuals too serve as vessels through which others perceive the
winds of history—in a sense theories in their own right. Nasser was more than the President of
Egypt; he embodied the aspirations and power of an entire generation of Egyptians.
Heraclitus intuited this principle in ancient Greece, and proved accurate in his assessment.
Nasser contained the vast, collectively incomprehensible forces of history in a single man—the
one is made up of all things. The man, in turn, would irrevocably alter the course of Egyptian
history, dramatically influencing twentieth-century national, geopolitical, imperial, and economic
history through his historical activism—all things issue from the one. Nasser embodied, and to a
degree is responsible for, his nation’s shared history.
History itself is a “large” subject, meaning one can spend their whole life learning and still
feel as if they know little to nothing of the course of human events. There are many ways to focus
this largeness, coalescing disparate pieces of knowledge into a single intelligible story. Historians
accomplish this translation by employing signifiers, symbols that represent more than the sum of
their parts. Nasser was one such signifier. He exemplified the profound role a single person could
play in human affairs, and reminds one that, in the face of seemingly insurmountable, deterministic
historical forces, there will always be (some) room for the individual.
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Returning briefly to the present: Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky’s struggle has, in
historical terms, barely begun, and historians have yet to critically assess his impact in stymieing
Russia’s aggression. However, examining Nasser and the Suez Crisis can perhaps offer a glimpse
of the future. Through the skillful employment of mass media and shrewdly-constructed appeals
to the international community designed to influence their opinion, Zelensky (subconsciously,
perhaps) seeks to follow in Nasser’s footsteps—not as a commander of armor, men, or materiel,
but as a commander of the microphone, the podium, and the mass media. While Zelensky cannot
save his nation without the help of the wider world, including international processes far beyond
his control, he can, like Nasser, manipulate those to his advantage. While technology has advanced
immensely since 1956, General Charles Keightly’s “overriding lesson,” emphasizing the primacy
of courting world opinion in modern war, remains startingly accurate; Zelensky is holding the line,
with assistance from his newfound international allies swayed by his propaganda campaign.218
Nasser knew that lesson as well—and without reading Keightly’s report. His response to a
reporter’s inquest into his outward disdain towards then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri es-Said, spoke
not only to the importance of influencing world opinion, but to the historical legacy potentially
defined by perception and constructed narrative. Nasser proclaimed, “Nuri is a dictator. He censors
the press; he imprisons political opponents…” The reporter enquired, “More than you do?”, to
which Nasser replied, “No, not more, but less efficiently.”219 By 1958 Nuri’s mutilated corpse
would be paraded through the streets of Baghdad by his own people, 220 while Nasser would receive
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the adulation of the Egyptian nation, that he in large part built, for decades to come—with no sign
of stopping.
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